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ABSTRACT 
Railroad-highway at-grade crossings have historically been the subject of 
substantive research given the heightened risk of fatal and severe injury when traffic 
crashes occur at these locations. To improve safety, active warning devices, such as 
flashing lights and gates, have been installed to warn drivers of oncoming trains. Various 
studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of these devices, but research has been 
limited with respect to the occurrence of crashes involving these warning devices. The 
supports for such devices are generally rigid and non-breakaway, posing as a fixed-object 
obstacle for motorists. A few states, including Idaho, Iowa, and Washington, include 
guardrail designs to protect the signal. However, guidance is generally limited in this 
regard. 
To that end, this study involves an in-service evaluation on the safety performance 
of signalized railroad crossings within Iowa. The study leverages data from 2007 to 2016 
to examine how the number and severity of crashes varies depending upon whether 
guardrail is installed at these locations. Over 1800 signalized crossings were analyzed and 
results show that crashes are more frequent in the presence of guardrail; however, such 
crashes tend to result in reduced severity compared to collisions directly involving the 
roadside hardware (i.e. without a barrier). Simulation analyses using the Roadside Safety 
Analysis Program suggest that moving the railroad signal further from the roadway 
provided the best alternative in both the presence and absence of guardrail.   
Improving the guardrail design and ensuring the proper construction could make 
this system more beneficial. Ultimately, few crossings include such a design in which only 
a limited crash sample is available to compare to a base-case scenario. Handbooks suggest 
x 
using a crash cushion at these locations, but no designs were found and even fewer 
crossings nationwide provide such a barrier. 
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Overview 
Railroad-highway at-grade crossings can be the scene for some of the most dangerous 
types of traffic crashes. The vehicles on these networks differ significantly in several 
characteristics including mass, ground clearance, and their resistance to rollover. 
Consequently, the prevention of crashes at these intersections has been an important focus of 
transportation agencies and railroad companies for nearly a century (Muntz, 1931).  
While there are fewer crashes at railroad-highway intersections compared to standard 
roadway intersections, the consequences can be vastly different. In addition to fatalities and 
serious injuries, railroad-highway crossing crashes can result in derailments that can cause 
considerable damage, disruption to both the rail and roadway systems, including the possibility 
of contamination from hazardous materials. There are at least seven distinct categories of 
incidents that can be identified at these crossings, which include: 1) train striking motor 
vehicle, 2) motor vehicle striking train, 3) rear-end collision between two or more vehicles, 
one of which that has already stopped or slowed down, 4) unsafe backing, where a vehicle 
backs into a stopped vehicle to increase the distance between them and the tracks or attempting 
to find an alternative route to avoid the train, 5) loss of traction while crossing, 6) roadway 
departure crashes, and 7) motor vehicle striking railroad crossing signal apparatus such as 
signal poles or controller boxes (Figure 1.1). 
To reduce the risk of vehicle-striking-train and train-striking-vehicle collisions, the 
installation of active warning devices has been a major focus of crossing safety efforts in the 
United States as well as in many other countries. A common active warning device is train-
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activated flashing lights, which is also the most basic type. Higher risk crossings (geometrically 
skewed, visibility constraints, high traffic volumes, high train traffic, or unusually wide) are 
often supplemented with gates or overhead cantilever beams outfitted with additional flashing 
lights. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Railway-Highway Crossing (Section 
130) Program reported a 57% decrease in fatalities between 1987 and 2014 from at-grade 
crossings that received funds to eliminate hazards (FHWA, 2018). 
 
 
(a) 
Motor vehicle crash with signal mast and 
cantilever (Danbury, CT). 
Photo: Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority of New York (WLAD, 2016) 
 
(b) 
Motor vehicle crash with controller box 
(Smyrna, GA). 
Photo: Sydney Busby (Busby, 2012) 
Figure 1.1 Examples of motor vehicle crashes with railroad signal apparatus. 
Barriers, such as guardrail, are sometimes installed at or near at-grade crossings to 
protect the motorist (e.g. from traversing down a steep embankment) or to protect the signal 
mast (e.g. tractor-trailer making too sharp of a turn). While the effectiveness of active signal 
warnings in reducing vehicle-train collisions and number of fatalities is well-documented 
(Meeker, Fox, & Weber, 1997; Raub, 2006; Lenné, et al., 2011), crashes with the devices 
themselves could occur. Surprisingly, no research on such crashes was found, nor was any 
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research found on crashes with barriers at railroad crossings. Thus, this study sets out to assess 
the prevalence of crashes involving railroad signal masts and related apparatus in the state of 
Iowa and to provide preliminary consideration of whether a guardrail design is beneficial in 
reducing signal mast crashes. 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) compiles statistical 
information on various categories of fixed-point-hazard crashes, such as trees, utility poles, 
and lighting fixtures. In the United States, collisions with fixed objects account for 14.7% of 
all reported crashes but result in 30.9% of the fatal crashes (NHTSA, 2017). In Iowa, it was 
reported that 27% of fatal crashes were with fixed objects. The report also stated that 
nationwide, motorcycles had the highest proportion of collisions with fixed objects; the lowest 
being buses. Guardrail crashes accounted for approximately 1.7% of all crashes and 2.8% of 
all fatal crashes as the first harmful event. 
NHTSA’s Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) indicates that in 2016 there were 
896 fatal crashes with guardrail in the United States, resulting in 1599 deaths (NHTSA, 2018). 
FARS has no specific category for crashes involving railroad signal masts, so such crashes are 
reasonably dispersed amongst at least three broadly-titled categories. 
1.1.2 Prevalence of Railroad-Highway Crossing Crashes 
The prevalence of any type of crash can be dependent upon the reporting requirements. 
At railroad-highway crossings two industries are involved, which can cause different 
interpretations on the number of incidents that occur. The Federal Railroad Administration’s 
(FRA) accident reporting requirements are codified in Federal Regulation 49 CFR 225, and 
through Form FRA F 6180.57, any impact, regardless of severity, is to be reported; however, 
this only includes incidents between railroad on-track equipment and a highway user (FRA, 
2018a). While the damage to signals and track structures (e.g. controller box) can be used to 
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meet the reporting damage cost thresholds of Form FRA F 6180.54 (in 2017 this value was 
$10,700), the FRA does not report crashes that only involve the apparatus. Meanwhile, Iowa’s 
motor vehicle crash reporting system, Traffic and Criminal Software (TraCS), generally will 
record any motor vehicle incident causing a fatality, injury, or total property damage exceeding 
$1500 (Iowa DOT, 2018a). These TraCS records were accessible through the Iowa Department 
of Transportation’s (DOT) Iowa Crash Analysis Tool (ICAT) database. Within the ICAT 
system there are two fields for identifying crashes that take place at a railroad at-grade crossing, 
but like FARS, there is not a field to identify crashes with the signals themselves. The 
differences between these reporting databases are evident in Table 1.1. From 2007 to 2016, the 
annual average number of railroad-highway incidents reported to the Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) by railroads operating in Iowa was 47.9. In comparison, Iowa law 
enforcement agencies reported over three and a half times as many crossing-involved crashes, 
an average of 170.8 per year. Iowa ranked thirteenth in the nation in the number of incidents 
at public at-grade crossings and fifteenth in non-fatal injuries over the same ten years (FRA, 
2018b). 
Table 1.1 Comparison of Reported Railroad Crossing Crashes from Two Databases 
Year Public Crossing Incidents Reported by Railroads in FRA Database in Iowa (FRA, 2018b) 
Public Crossing Crashes 
Reported by Iowa DOT in TraCS 
2007 74 200 
2008 64 182 
2009 47 182 
2010 49 190 
2011 38 156 
2012 41 170 
2013 43 150 
2014 45 162 
2015 43 171 
2016 35 145 
TOTAL 479 1708 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this study is determining the potential impacts of installing 
guardrail at railroad at-grade crossings, particularly how its presence may affect crash 
frequency and injury severity. Of specific interest is whether it is cost-effective to install such 
systems in consideration of differences in safety performance.  
In addition, the study also involves a synthesis on the current practices of state 
transportation agencies with respect to the installation of barriers, including the design of the 
railroad signal masts, as well as the role of driver behavior in these types of crashes. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters, which detail the background of the 
research problem of interest, provide context with respect to the existing research literature 
and design practices, describe the data and study methods, deliver findings in respect to the 
research questions of interest, and present conclusions and recommendations. A brief 
description of each chapter is as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction – This chapter establishes background information on the 
safety of railroad-highway crossings, as well as identifying the need for additional research in 
this and other areas. The background is followed by the research hypothesis and objectives that 
address these questions.   
Chapter 2: State of the Practice Review – This chapter describes the status of design 
practices being performed in regards to railroad-highway crossings, nationwide. During this 
study, a survey was conducted on several agencies throughout the United States that collected 
information about the crashworthiness of the warning signal devices and the installment of 
protective measures.   
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Chapter 3: Literature Review – This chapter is divided into three sections with each 
describing previous research applicable to this study. The first section discusses information 
on guardrail and its use as protection to motorists. The second section describes the injury 
severity related to the several types of crashes involved within this study. Lastly, the third 
section provides context to the behavior of drivers at crossings.  
Chapter 4: Data Description – This chapter details the data collection processes that 
went into this study. This includes the details on how the data was aggregated within several 
data sources, including those from the Iowa Department of Transportation and Federal 
Railroad Administration to form an inventory. Lastly, this chapter presents descriptive 
statistics on the data. 
Chapter 5: Methodology – This chapter describes the various methods that were used 
to analyze the dataset. A discussion as to the reasons why these methods are appropriate is 
provided.  
Chapter 6: Results – This chapter discusses the results of the study and details the 
outcomes from the models performed on the datasets. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations – This chapter summarizes the major 
findings and how they pertain to the initial research questions of interest. Also included are the 
limitations with the data and areas for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2.    STATE OF THE PRACTICE REVIEW 
2.1 Crashworthiness Practices 
2.1.1 Overview and Guidelines 
The 2009 Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) has a complicated 
set of crashworthiness requirements for railroad-crossing-warning-devices (FHWA, 2009). It 
states that passive (unsignalized) crossings must be mounted on frangible (breakaway) posts 
or poles; meanwhile, the use of use of breakaway hardware for railroad overhead or cantilever 
structures is prohibited. The MUTCD does not specify whether breakaway bases are needed 
at crossings with flashing lights but no gates. In practice, signal masts at flashing-lights-only 
crossings are almost always installed in accordance with the American Railway Engineering 
and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA) standards, which define very rigid, non-
crashworthy poles. 
The use of non-frangible masts at railroad crossings contradicts the current practice for 
similar hardware supports located in the clear zone, including pedestal-style traffic signals and 
pedestrian crossing signals (Figure 2.1). Typically, these devices are designed to conform to 
the requirements of the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide (RDG) (AASHTO, 2011). AASHTO 
also provides specifications for structural supports; a widely used approach is to mount the 
signal mast on a frangible base (AASHTO, 2015). Ultimately, an errant vehicle will impact 
the side of the base, causing the signal mast to pivot and fall away from the point of impact 
(Figure 2.2). Conversely, photos of crashes involving railroad signal masts show the pole 
remaining upright at impact energies that appear to be well beyond those sufficient to knock 
over RDG-compliant masts (Figure 2.3). Railroad signal masts can experience little damage
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(a) 
Pedestal-style traffic signal (Ames, IA). 
Photo: Google Maps (Google, 2013) 
 
(b) 
Pedestrian crossing signal (North 
Reddington Beach, FL). 
Photo: BFF (Best Foot Forward, 2015) 
Figure 2.1 Example of two crashworthy hardware supports. 
 
Photo: Prospect Heights Neighborhood Development Council (PHNDC, 2011) 
Figure 2.2 Traffic signal hardware shown to fall away from the direction of impact (New 
York, NY). 
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when involved in a vehicle crash. The only damage noticed from the mast is to the 
counterweights for the gate assembly; however, the vehicle can become disabled and 
undriveable from the scene of the crash. 
(a) 
Signal mast damage from motor vehicle 
crash (Brimson, MN). 
Photo: Scott Cyr (2018) 
 
(b) 
Motor vehicle damage from striking 
signal mast (Brimson, MN). 
Photo: Scott Cyr (2018) 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of damages from motor vehicle crash striking railroad signal mast. 
 In regards to protecting railroad crossing signal devices, the FHWA Railroad-Highway 
Grade Crossing Handbook and the RDG both recommend shielding the supports at high speed 
locations, using a crash cushion (not guardrail) (FHWA, 2007; AASHTO, 2011). The reasons 
to steer away from using guardrail are: the lack of room for proper treatment, creating a larger 
roadside hazard, and the possibility that the guardrail may direct an errant vehicle into an 
oncoming train, if one is present. In practice, only one impact attenuator exists that is intended 
to protect a pole on both sides, which has only been accepted at National Cooperative Highway 
Research Program (NCHRP) Test Level 1 (TL-1) (impact speed of 35-mph) (Lindsay 
Corporation). The two handbooks note that guardrail may be used when there is a steep slope 
and state that, if used, the guardrail should protect the motor vehicle and not to be used to 
protect the mast itself. In low speed locations with high truck traffic, such as industrial areas, 
the FHWA handbook does suggest protecting the signal mast using ring-style guardrail (Figure 
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2.4) (FHWA, 2007). The language within the MUTCD is similar, and states, as an option, in 
Section 8C.01 Paragraph 13, “In industrial or other areas involving only low-speed highway 
traffic or where signals are vulnerable to damage by turning truck traffic, guardrail may be 
installed to provide protection for the signal assembly” (FHWA, 2009). The difference lies in 
the explicit nature of the syntax in which the MUTCD only states “guardrail” allowing for 
different interpretations. The MUTCD also explains, “a lateral escape route to the right of the 
highway in advance of the grade crossing traffic control devices should be kept free of 
guardrail or other ground obstructions. Where guardrail is not deemed necessary or 
appropriate, barriers should not be used for protecting signal supports” (FHWA, 2009). 
 
Photo: Justin Cyr (2018) 
Figure 2.4 Ring-style guardrail example (Garden City, IA) (USDOT 876096M). 
The MUTCD describes the minimum horizontal clearances for the signal systems. It 
gives guidance that controller cabinet boxes should have a lateral offset of at least 30 feet from 
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the edge of roadway. For signalized crossing signals, a minimum horizontal offset of 2 feet is 
required from the face of vertical curb or paved shoulder, with at least six feet of clearance 
from the edge of traveled way when there is no curb. At passive crossings, the offsets remain 
the same distances; however, they are only under guidance. In rural areas, there also exists a 
guidance offset of 12 feet from the edge of traveled way. On the 2007 railroad standard 
drawings in Iowa (RD-6 and RD-7), they included this 12-foot specification on the passive 
signs as well as on the active warning signals (Iowa DOT, 2007).  While the passive crossings 
are only guidelines and the active crossings are standards, it is still interesting that there exists 
a greater offset distance for breakaway signs versus rigid, non-breakaway signals. There is no 
maximum horizontal offset stipulated in the MUTCD for railroad crossing signals. 
Some states, including Iowa, Idaho, and Washington State, have design standards in 
place that contain guardrail installation protecting the railroad signal. Guardrail is installed to 
prevent more dangerous crashes from occurring under the premise that striking the barrier will 
lead to a reduction in crash severity compared to roll over or striking the object. Details on the 
Iowa-specific designs can be found in Section 2.1.2. In Idaho, standard drawing G-1-J (Figure 
2.5) shows both longitudinal and ring-style designs, which the agency labels as rural 
installation and urban railroad signal barrier, respectively. The back of the posts on the 
longitudinal guardrail are desired to have a 2-foot offset from the center of the pole, and a 4-
foot minimum offset from the guardrail face. In the ring-style design, Idaho Transportation 
Department (ITD) indicates a 5-foot radius from the signal foundation and a minimum of 4 
feet of clearance from the guardrail face. ITD sets a maximum threshold of 40 miles-per-hour 
(mph) for these installations in urban areas, and are set a minimum of 18 inches behind face of 
curb when no pedestrian traffic is present. In Washington State, under Standard Plan C-20.14-
12 
03 Beam Guardrail Type 31 Placement Case 3-31, there is example of longitudinal guardrail 
at a railroad crossing (Figure 2.6). In Washington State DOT’s (WSDOT) design, the signal 
support offset is a minimum of 5 feet from the guardrail face, and it is noted that the distance 
from edge of shoulder and the face of guardrail varies by case. In Chapter 32 of WSDOT Local 
Agency Guidelines, it describes a minimum of 2 feet between the guardrail face and edge of 
shoulder (WSDOT, 2018) (Figure 2.7). The document also states, “a railroad signal may be a 
point hazard warranting the use of a traffic barrier or crash cushion” and “a guardrail should 
be installed if the speed limit is greater than 35 mph.”  
 
Source: ITD (Idaho Transportation Department, 2006) 
Figure 2.5 Idaho Transportation Department Standard Drawing G-1-J Revision 6 dated 05-
03-2006. 
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Source: WSDOT (WSDOT, 2014) 
Figure 2.6 Washington State DOT Standard C-20.14-03 Beam Guardrail Type 31 Placement 
Case 3-31 dated 06-11-2014. 
 
Source: WSDOT (WSDOT, 2018) 
Figure 2.7 Washington State DOT Shoulder Section Elevation View for Submittal from 
WSDOT Local Agency Guidelines M 36-63.36. 
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In other countries, railroad at-grade crossings can differ significantly in the way they 
appear and the hardware used to warn drivers. Even remote locations within the United States 
can differ, such as crossings in Hawai'i (Figure 2.8). Although Hawai'i does not have a railroad 
division within their state transportation agency, they do have some at-grade crossings. The 
figure shows a signalized railroad crossing with separate apparatus for its gate assembly and 
signal mast. It also appears to have traffic signal hardware for the flashing lights. Other 
countries, such as Australia, Finland, Germany and Japan, do install devices to protect the mast 
from being struck. 
 
Photo: Google Maps (Google, 2011a) 
Figure 2.8 Example of a signalized railroad crossing in Hawai'i (Kapolei, HI). 
2.1.2 Practice in Iowa 
In the state of Iowa, Standard Road Plan BA-253 (Figure 2.9) calls for a longitudinal 
guardrail with a crashworthy end terminal to be installed at railroad crossings on federal-aid 
highways. Iowa also has Standard Road Plan LS-633, which is a part of the local systems, and 
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differs only in the flared guardrail piece and the end terminal (Figure 2.10). Since the revision 
is dated 2016 to Standard Road Plan BA-253, most crossings are from a previous standard that 
included the Sequential Kinking Terminal (SKT) following NCHRP 350 TL-3. 
These designs are intended to prevent vehicles that run off the road to the right from 
striking the signal mast. To avoid encroaching on the railroad, the guardrail can only extend a 
short distance past the signal mast; consequently, the downstream end of the guardrail provides 
limited protection to vehicles that run off the road to the left. The distance between the signal 
mast and the guardrail is not explicitly stipulated within the design standard. While the state’s 
guardrail guideline calls for 5 feet of clearance distance between the guardrail and the fixed 
object (reduced to 4 feet if the posts are installed at half of the standard spacing) (Figure 2.11) 
(Iowa DOT, 2017), this is rarely the case for railroad signals. This problem can be encountered 
because the placement of the railroad signal mast is usually installed prior to the installment of 
guardrail. In Chapter 8C of the MUTCD, it states that there should be a horizontal offset of 2 
feet from the face of the vertical curb or the edge of the paved road surface to the closest part 
of the signal, with an offset of at least 6 feet from the edge of the traveled way (FHWA, 2009). 
In the Iowa Design Manual, longitudinal guardrail is preferred to have a minimum offset of 2 
feet from the edge of the shoulder to reduce the number of nuisance hits (Iowa DOT, 2017). A 
3-foot shoulder in this scenario would only leave 1 foot of clearance between the guardrail and 
the closest point of the signal mast. Intruding on the clearance zone may affect the guardrail’s 
ability to safely contain or redirect the vehicle, since it does not have proper deflection.  
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Source: Iowa DOT (Iowa DOT, 2016) 
Figure 2.9 Standard Road Plan BA-253 Revision 3 dated 04-19-2016. 
 
Source: Iowa DOT (Iowa DOT, 2016) 
Figure 2.10 Standard Road Plan LS-633 Revision 1 dated 04-19-2016. 
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Source: Iowa DOT (Iowa DOT, 2017) 
Figure 2.11 Guardrail placement in front of a fixed object. 
The guardrail design detailed thus far is the third revision. Figure 2.12 shows an 
example of a previous design, one that does not include the crashworthy end treatment. In 
2009, the Iowa DOT adopted a modified W-beam guardrail as the standard for the state. This 
type is referred to as the Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) and uses a mounting height of 31 
inches, whereas the prior standard called for 27 inches; the blockout depth also increased from 
8 inches to 12 inches in the new design (Iowa DOT, 2011; Iowa DOT, 2017). In most cases, 
the practice is to use wood posts at railroad crossings instead of steel posts. 
Even though there are design standards in place, this does not guarantee that the 
construction and implementation will be as designed. The railroad company in most cases will 
install the warning system device first and then the guardrail is installed at a later time, and a 
few problems may arise as a part of this. First, if the signal mast is installed too close to the 
edge of shoulder or roadway, this leaves little room for either lateral clearance or deflection of 
the guardrail (see Figure 2.12). 
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Photo: Justin Cyr (2018) 
Figure 2.12 Longitudinal guardrail design from a previous standard (Elkhart, IA) (USDOT 
876035W). 
Another problem with the guardrail being installed too close to the signal mast is that 
the flashing light assembly becomes prone to damage even if a motorist does not strike the 
guardrail, ultimately defeating the motive to install the barrier in the first place. Next, if the 
signal mast is placed too close to the railroad tracks proper treatment is no longer possible as 
it begins to impede on the clearance needed for a train to pass through the intersection (see 
Figure 2.13). Another problem can also occur when a roadway is improved or widened and the 
signal and guardrail keep their existing locations. Solutions to these problems could include 
explicit locations detailed for the placement of the railroad signal and that more communication 
exists between the various agencies involved.  
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Photo: Google Maps (Google, 2017) 
Figure 2.13 Example of railroad crossing with guardrail terminating before reaching the 
signal mast (St. Paul, MN). 
2.2 Survey 
2.2.1 Background 
Engineers, administrators, and law enforcement officials from various transportation 
agencies (from both railroad and highway) were surveyed to explore the prevalence of crashes 
involving railroad infrastructure at railroad at-grade crossings and to gather information on 
design standards for protective barriers for warning systems. The survey was conducted 
through internet distribution and response, and was approved exempt by the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) at Iowa State University.   
2.2.2 Results 
A total of 90 surveys were distributed across all 50 states, and 18 complete responses 
were retrieved. Figure 2.14 shows a map of the states that had participation. 
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Figure 2.14 States that participated in the survey. 
When asked if they had received reports of motorists striking railroad signals or control 
boxes in their areas, or observed evidence of hit-and-run crashes involving this equipment, 
61% stated that they had. Upon reading comments from these responses, almost all indicated 
that they were very rare occurrences, and only one agency reported that there were fatalities 
associated. Another item asked was if railroad-signaling equipment was protected by various 
types of safety features. Three-quarters of the responders included at least one form of barrier 
used in their area; a graph showing the distribution of those types can be seen in Figure 2.15. 
The most common type of protective device was guardrail and was mostly in urban 
regions. In most of these cases, this is likely ring-style guardrail placed near commercial 
driveways, as a few respondents noted in their comments. The remaining types (bollards or 
posts and crash cushions or impact attenuators) were found in both urban and rural areas. 
No response 
Response 
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Figure 2.15 Distribution of safety devices to protect railroad-warning-signal-systems. 
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CHAPTER 3.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
The presence of guardrail affects the path the vehicle would normally take in a run-off-
road (ROR) situation. Figure 3.1 outlines a few basic scenarios with two different conditions 
(with and without train present). The hypothetical trajectories are based on single vehicle 
interactions with no oncoming motor vehicle traffic and the assumption that no pocketing 
occurs with the vehicle and the guardrail upon impact. Each of the four examples illustrates 
two ROR right situations (paths A & B), two ROR left situations (paths C & D), and a nominal 
lane position, base-case (path N). Although the guardrail system is intended to reduce the 
severity of path B crashes, it appears to likely affect the other paths to varying degrees.  
A railroad crossing without guardrail is sketched in Figure 3.1a. With no train present, 
paths A and C result in the errant vehicle entering the roadside/trackside area, while paths B 
and D result in striking a signal mast. As shown in Figure 3.1b, when guardrail is added, paths 
A, B, and C result in guardrail strikes that redirect the errant vehicle back toward the roadway. 
Since the downstream end of the guardrail cannot extend past the signal mast, ROR left path 
D likely could still impact the signal mast; otherwise striking the guardrail terminal (rounded 
thrie-beam end section, also called the “question mark” end piece).  
When a train is present, the guardrail has potentially unintended effects. As shown in 
Figure 3.1c, without guardrail a driver on path A can potentially avoid colliding with the train 
by steering to the right (path A1). Similarly, a driver who is in-lane, but approaches the crossing 
too rapidly, could also ditch a vehicle by turning parallel to the track (path N1). An inattentive 
or excessively speeding driver might be unable to make an evasive maneuver and would 
probably hit the train (paths A2 and N2). Without guardrail, an errant driver on path B would 
hypothetically strike the signal mast while paths C and D result in striking the train. In the last 
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diagram, Figure 3.1d, with guardrail and a train present, colliding with a train appears as the 
result in all of the situations. The only exception would be a driver ditching to the left.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
 
  
Figure 3.1 Hypothetical vehicle trajectories for various conditions. 
Although Figure 3.1 represents hypothetical scenarios, it indicates the complexity of 
determining whether there is a benefit or disbenefit of installing the guardrail system. Crash 
severity seems likely to be reduced in train-not-present conditions and increased in the 
presence of a train. Thus, the net value will be greatly influenced by the length of time the 
crossing is occupied. This variable could be calculable with data on the number of trains per 
day, length of train, and the speed of the train. Crash outcomes in the field are subject to be 
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affected by various site conditions, such as terrain and the location of other obstacles (e.g. 
utility poles, buildings, vehicles, pedestrians, etc.). Very few railroad crossings in Iowa are 
equipped with video monitoring that would allow field observations of actual crash or near-
crash trajectories, so an extent literature review was conducted on the available research. The 
following sections discuss the different areas of the research question of interest, as well as try 
to understand different driving behaviors in these situations. 
3.1 Guardrail Protection 
There has been few to no literature articles on the guardrail protection at railroad-
highway crossings, let alone the protection by any safety device at such an intersection. 
However, there have been studies done on the protection of other fixed devices by means of 
guardrail systems. The structural performance of guardrail has been tested through full-scale 
crash tests, simulations, and finite element analysis. 
Luminaire pole placement behind MGS was studied using nonlinear finite element 
analysis (Pajouh, Reid, Bielenberg, Schmidt, & Faller, 2017). Using LS-DYNA, results 
showed that poles placed within 16 inches behind steel posts might cause concern to the 
acceptable crash test performance. Within this study, only one of the four simulations passed 
Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware (MASH) test criteria and in that simulation there was 
significant damage to several component of the vehicle including the tire/wheels and the 
suspension. It passed because it did not pose harm to the passenger compartment.  
Pajouh et al. (2017) conducted another study using computer simulations and compared 
the results with full-scale crash testing (Pajouh, Bielenberg, Schmidt, Faller, & Reid, 2017). 
Based on the simulation, it was found that the most critical pole offset was 20 inches laterally 
behind the back of post and 24 inches longitudinally downstream from post number 13 for a 
pick-up truck. For a passenger car, offsets of 20 inches laterally and 8 inches longitudinally 
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downstream from post number 13 were found to be the most critical pole placement. In 
comparison to the crash tests according to TL-3 MASH test designations 3-10 and 3-11 (Figure 
3.2), the MGS contained and safely redirected both vehicles, concluding that the 41 inch offset 
between the face of the rail and the front face of the pole is a safe performance of the guardrail 
system.  
 
Source: (Pajouh, Bielenberg, Schmidt, Faller, & Reid, 2017) 
Figure 3.2 Recommended pole placement: (a) MASH test designation 3-11 and (b) MASH 
test designation 3-10. 
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3.2 Crash Severity 
Roadside barriers, like guardrail, are installed to prevent more dangerous crashes from 
occurring, such as collisions with poles, trees, or steep slopes. Zou et al (2014) found that 
colliding with almost any barrier, regardless of its offset from the roadway, reduced the 
probability of an injury compared to colliding with a high-risk object (Zou, Tarko, Chen, & 
Romero, 2014). The two exceptions to this list were closely located concrete barriers and 
guardrail end terminals. Thus, these barriers may also contribute to fatal and serious injury 
crashes.  
A study in Washington State between 1993 and 1996 looked at the crash severity with 
roadside objects in urban areas (Holdridge, Shankar, & Ulfarsson, 2005). They found the 
greatest number of crashes with roadside barriers were with concrete barrier face (32.0%), 
guardrail face (16.0%), and poles (including railroad signal masts) (11.7%). The proportion of 
severe injury was found to be the reverse of the previous list, in that crashes with poles 
accounted for about 6.3%, guardrail face (3.0%), and concrete barrier face (2.8%). Holdridge 
et al. also found that striking the guardrail face or concrete barrier decreases the propensity 
toward an injury indicating a significant injury prevention benefit from crashes that would have 
struck a pole. Drivers were more likely to suffer injuries if they were committing any driving 
violations, such as operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, exceeding the speed 
limit, or inattentive driving. Guardrail end terminals and railroad poles showed significant 
susceptibility towards fatal and severe injuries; thus, concluding that it is important to use 
properly designed end treatment and upgrade the badly performing ones.  
The injury risk in striking a guardrail end terminal was found to be not statistically 
distinguishable from the injury risk of a high-risk event (e.g. rigid roadside object, tree, or 
conditions that would lead to rollover) (Zou, Tarko, Chen, & Romero, 2014). More 
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specifically, they found that the odds of injury associated with hitting a guardrail face is 65% 
lower than striking a high-risk event. 
Gabauer and Gabler (2010) studied the deployment and effects of seatbelts and airbags 
on occupant injuries with respect to collisions with guardrail and other longitudinal barriers 
(Gabauer & Gabler, 2010). In vehicles with airbags, the authors found a seatbelt usage rate of 
86%, comparable to the national average (Li & Pickrell, 2018, April, revised). In these 
vehicles, the airbags deployed in almost 75% of the tow-away severity crashes, which indicates 
that this is not a rare event. In approximately 96% of the collisions, the occupants sustained 
either minor injuries or only property damage only. Odds ratios for fully restrained (airbag and 
seat belt) occupants and seat belt only restrained occupants were similar suggesting that there 
is only a small safety benefit with airbags; however, both seat belts and airbags were found to 
reduce the odds of a serious occupant injury and a dramatically reduced risk of a serious injury 
if restrained by both methods. Other research has found that impacts with barriers may cause 
late deployment of an airbag, potentially increasing the occupant injury (Grzebieta, Zou, Jiang, 
& Carey, 2005). 
 Crash severity should be treated special for cases that involve motorcycles. While a 
barrier may protect and serve as a safety treatment to most motorists, it may be have 
consequences to other users. Motorcycles were found to compose about 3% of the vehicle fleet 
but accounted for almost half of all fatalities with guardrail from 2003-2008 (Daniello & 
Gabler, 2011a). The authors also found that collisions with guardrail are 7 times more likely 
to result in a fatality for a motorcyclist than collisions with just the ground (Daniello & Gabler, 
2011b). Railroad crossings, themselves, can present problems with vehicle control for 
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motorcycles, especially at rough crossings, only adding to the possibility of a single-vehicle 
crash.  
3.3 Driver Behavior 
Driver behavior at railroad-highway crossings can differ from normal driving 
conditions. Railroad crossings can be some of the most dangerous locations for distracted 
driving, due to the possibility of not detecting the warning signals and colliding with an 
oncoming train. There have been several studies conducted on driving behavior and the 
decisions made by drivers at railroad-highway crossings. Approximately 30% of the time a 
vehicle is in motion, the driver is engaged in a potentially distracting secondary task (Sayer, 
Devonshire, & Flannagan, 2005; Ranney, 2008). A secondary task is defined as a task that 
diverts the attention to focus on an object, person, or event not related to driving. Frequency 
and complexity of the secondary task have an important role in determining the impact on 
driver performance. It is possible that a task that is less complex but has a much higher 
occurrence is as much influential as a highly complex task at a lower occurrence. At railroad 
crossings, drivers of light vehicles were likely to engage in secondary tasks 46.7% of the time, 
(Ngamdung & daSilva, 2013); while drivers of heavy trucks were likely to engage in secondary 
tasks about 21% (Ngamdung & daSilva, 2012).  
Shinar and Raz (1982) studied the behavior of driving speed at three different types of 
crossings: passive, active with flashing lights, and active with flashing lights and gates. They 
found that drivers slowed before crossing the tracks under all conditions, with the largest 
reduced approach speeds at crossings with activated lights and gates lowered, and the smallest 
at crossings with gates raised and flashing lights unactivated (Shinar & Raz, 1982). The article 
also explained that all drivers in the study came to a stop in the presence of flashing lights; 
however, over a third ended up crossing the tracks.  
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An observational study was conducted at a suburban Indiana at-grade crossing that 
upgraded from flashing lights to flashing lights with gates, comparing the differences in driver 
behavior (Meeker, Fox, & Weber, 1997). The two-lane, paved county highway received light 
traffic volumes (500 vehicles/day) with 30-40 trains daily. The authors described the crossing 
as remaining unchanged between the five years from which it was upgraded. The study looked 
at drivers who arrived at the crossing after the flashing lights were activated but before a train 
had arrived during daylight hours. Upgrading the crossing with gates significantly lowered the 
number of vehicles crossing in front of an oncoming train; however, fewer drivers halted at 
these intersections before proceeding to cross, and significantly more drivers neither stopped 
nor slowed down. The likelihood of crossing was found to reduce as trains neared, but there 
failed to be a relationship with the speed of the train. This possibly suggests that it is difficult 
to perceive trains’ speed as it approaches the crossing.  
An on-road analysis was performed in Australia on a predetermined urban route as 
drivers gave verbal feedback while two observers in the vehicle studied their behavior and 
situational awareness (Salmon, Lenné, Young, & Walker, 2013). The study used a network 
analysis methodology to form relationships with the data they received from the drivers. The 
route included four railroad at-grade crossings and focused on the comparison between 
experienced and novice drivers. Novices were found to have higher word counts and include 
concepts relating towards their own actions, while experienced drivers’ key concepts were 
related to other road users and other road users’ actions. Experienced drivers extracted less raw 
information from the driving situation but were able to generate more connected models. 
Within these models, it is interesting to note that pedestrian crossings nearby railroad crossings 
showed more prominence than the rail crossings, themselves. The authors suggest that drivers 
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may not necessary be focused on the warning devices and could pass through the crossing 
without integrating them into their schema, which could lead to a potential problem when a 
train is approaching. Unsafe driving behavior at railroad crossings is location-specific; 
however, responses to the same safety treatment were found to be similar in magnitude 
(Khattak, 2009). 
Drivers were studied on driver behavior at six railroad crossings in Nebraska in 2013 
using high-resolution surveillance cameras (Tung & Khattak, 2015). The crossings consisted 
of two tracks on multiple lane highways with flashing lights, audible bells, and dual-quadrant 
gates. About one-third of the observed drivers were found to be distracted, with the most 
common task being talking to the front-seat passenger. A binary-probit model was performed 
on the dataset and the authors found that more drivers were distracted at crossings with 
intersection roadways within 250 feet and fewer distracted driving behavior in the proximity 
of a potential distracting activity (e.g. work-zone, unattended vehicle, etc.). Another finding 
was that fewer drivers were distracted with increased traffic volumes. Gender did not reveal 
any significant differences with distracted driving; this was also the case in Ngamdung & Silva 
(2013). While weather was not found to be significant in Tung & Khatak (2015)’s study, Kirsch 
(2018) found that engaging in a distracting, secondary task was reduced by 42% in foggy 
conditions on freeways using naturalistic driving data (Kirsch, 2018). 
Another study in Nebraska studied crashes at or near railroad crossings found, on 
average, higher injury and fatality rates at these locations compared to highway locations 
outside of railroad crossings. Inattentive driving at or near railroad crossings and the effects 
they had on driver injuries were statistically comparable to driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (Zhao & Khattak, 2017a). Zhao and Khattak later studied inattentive drivers 
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through a survey questionnaire. Their findings showed that females had a higher risk of 
inattentive driving compared to males, and younger drivers (< 30 years old) also had a higher 
risk compared to older drivers (>= 60 years old) (Zhao & Khattak, 2017b). They also found 
that drivers that had less patience to wait for trains were associated with a higher risk of 
inattentive driving. This compares to Ngamdung et al. (2013) which found that younger and 
middle-aged drivers were more likely to engage in secondary tasks than older drivers 
(Ngamdung & daSilva, 2013). 
Driving behavior can also be affected by the presence of roadside objects and barriers. 
While the barrier reduces the injury severity compared to striking the fixed object itself (Lee 
& Mannering, 2002), the barrier may also be perceived as a hazard (Michie & Bronstad, 1994). 
Drivers were found to move away from guardrail unless a full lane (12 ft.) was present 
separating the travel lane from the barrier (van der Horst & de Ridder, 2007). Van der Horst 
and de Ridder also found that speeds were reduced when an obstacle (tree or guardrail) was 2 
meters (6.6 ft.) or closer but no effect when it was more than 4.5 meters (14.8 ft.). Ben-Basset 
& Shinar found similar results that higher speeds were found with 3-meter (9.8 ft.) shoulders 
compared to 0.5-meter (1.6 ft.) shoulders (Ben-Bassat & Shinar, 2011). They also found that 
simulation participants drove significantly faster than their perceived safe speed. Perceived 
safety was evaluated after the participants completed their driving simulation and consisted of 
a questionnaire that showed various scenarios. Perceived safety was also evaluated, and 
participants were asked to assess the safety on a scale from 1-10. Results showed that mean 
estimated safety was comparable at narrow shoulder widths between roadways with or without 
guardrail; as the right shoulder width widens the presence of guardrail increased the perceived 
safety. Drivers in the simulation tended to shift away from the guardrail as a result and drove 
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significantly closer to the left lane (Figure 3.4); Figure 3.3 shows a diagram of the driving 
simulation.  
 
Source: (Ben-Bassat & Shinar, 2011) 
Figure 3.3 Diagram of the driving simulation. 
 
Source: (Ben-Bassat & Shinar, 2011) 
Figure 3.4 Mean lane position of a motor vehicle in the right lane of a four-lane road during 
a driving simulation with and without guardrail. 
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CHAPTER 4.    DATA DESCRIPTION 
4.1 Data Background 
Data was collected from a variety of sources over the course of this study. This section 
describes the different resources used and how the applicability of these data are to the research 
questions of interest. A ten-year study period was chosen that captured the years from 2007 
through 2016. This time range was chosen over the most recent ten-year time-period (i.e. 2008 
to 2017) due to the available data from the crash information, discussed later in Section 4.1.3. 
Ten years of data represents the range over which the Iowa DOT maintains historical crash 
data and this analysis period has been used as a part of several research studies in this general 
area (Raub, 2006; Russo & Savolainen, 2013; Liu, Khattak, Richards, & Nambisan, 2015).  
4.1.1 Railroad Information 
4.1.1.1 Iowa Department of Transportation information 
A statewide railroad-crossing database from the Iowa DOT was used to create an 
inventory of the interested railroad crossings. This database was available online in the 
Geographic Information Management System (GIMS) and the Roadway Asset Management 
System (RAMS) through the Iowa DOT’s Open Data. The railroad networks used 
corresponded to the available datasets from the year preceding the study period until present 
day. From the two data portals, this included seven separate years of information from GIMS 
(2006-2011 and 2013) and one year of information from RAMS (2017). The Iowa DOT 
converted their GIMS to RAMS during this study, which is the reason for two separate data 
portals. A total of 5349 unique crossings were found in the combined Iowa DOT databases, 
with 4291 unique public at-grade crossings. 
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4.1.1.2 Federal Railroad Administration information 
A nationwide crossing database from the FRA was also used in the study. This data is 
provided through their Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory Database, which contains all current 
crossings, and is updated continuously. From this dataset, only crossings within the state of 
Iowa were selected, which included 15,028 unique records when it was downloaded. Of this 
total, 9,696 records were not included within the Iowa DOT’s database. This large difference 
is due to the Iowa DOT’s database being primarily public crossings including very few 
pedestrian and private crossings, where the FRA’s database includes all crossing types. In both 
of the railroad databases, the crossings were geocoded as singular points, which were supposed 
to identify the center of the roadway at which the railroad intersected the roadway. The FRA 
database was used as a secondary resource and only utilized for special cases.  
4.1.2 Roadway Information 
Several fields of information relating to the roadway information, such as average 
annual daily traffic (AADT), state system identifier, federal function classification, and surface 
type were already included within the railroad-crossing database. However, additional 
roadway features were also provided through the GIMS and RAMS portals. These portals were 
also accessed to provide clarity on certain features, in instances where values within the 
railroad database were blank, zero, or coded as other. 
For this study, specific information on the guardrail and concrete barrier locations was 
requested. Files on both of these were obtained from the Iowa DOT, which were in the form 
of geocoded line segments, but only included the barriers that were located on roadways under 
state jurisdiction. The two files did include a field indicating whether or not it was at a railroad 
crossing, and were used for quality control.  
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4.1.3 Crash Information 
Crash data were obtained from the Iowa DOT in two different arrangements, crash 
codes and crash narrative summaries. Both information sets were important to accurately 
identify the crashes of interest for this study.  
4.1.3.1 Crash code information 
Crashes within the state of Iowa were gathered from the Iowa DOT through the TraCS 
reporting system. This reporting system is a collection of crash report forms reported by law 
enforcement investigating officers that is updated annually and stores the ten most recent years. 
The TraCS system was accessible through the ICAT. These data contained three levels of 
pertaining information: crash, vehicle, and person. The crash-level includes general 
information regarding the specifics of the crash, such as location, type, and severity level. 
Vehicle-level breaks down each crash and includes information on each individual vehicle 
involved in the crash with fields such as the sequence of events, vehicle type, and damages. In 
the person-level file, there is information on each of the occupants in the vehicle. 
Demographics, such as age and gender, are recorded as well as the degree of injury sustained. 
Other fields of interest included are airbag deployment and restrained use. As mentioned 
previously, there exists two fields signifying that the crash occurred at a railroad crossing; 
however, there is not a railroad-signal-specific fixed-object. There were 1708 crashes that were 
reported to occur at a railroad crossing (active and passive) based on the law enforcement 
identification in the crash codes (Table 1.1). 
4.1.3.2 Crash narrative information 
Law enforcement crash-report-narratives were requested from the Iowa DOT to be able 
to accurately count the number of crashes of interest, as well as fully understand the crash 
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events and driver processes pertaining to the crashes. The narratives are provided with the 
crash identifier, allowing them to be linked and analyzed together. 
4.1.4 Cost Information 
To perform benefit-cost analyses, cost information was requested from the Iowa DOT. 
The different costs included guardrail installment, guardrail maintenance and repair, railroad 
insurance, and flagging. Some traffic signal crash repair costs were obtained from the 
Wisconsin DOT to compare to railroad signal masts. Details on how the information was used 
can found in Section 5.3.3. 
4.2 Data Collection 
This section describes how the data from these sources were collected and integrated 
for the purposes of the subsequent analyses. This includes how the active crossing were 
inventoried and how crashes with the railroad signal mast, guardrail, or nearby railroad 
equipment (e.g. controller box) were identified. 
4.2.1 Inventory Construction 
From both railroad databases, a combined listing of all unique crossings was created to 
form the inventory for this project. Each railroad crossing is assigned a crossing inventory 
number by the U.S. DOT, commonly referred to as the FRA number. This six-digit and one 
letter identifier is unique to each particular crossing in the country. The process of constructing 
an inventory was to locate all public at-grade crossings within the state of Iowa that were 
signalized at any time between 2007 and 2016.  
The list of all unique FRA numbers in both the Iowa DOT and FRA files included 
15,045 crossings. This total is of all records, including pedestrian, private, and grade separated 
crossings. While constructing this listing, the first and last available year of information at the 
specific crossing were inserted, as well as the AADT values for every year there was 
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information at the crossing. Within the information there exists fields relaying whether the 
crossing is public (TYPEXING = 3) and at-grade (POSXING = 1). Determining whether the 
crossing was signalized followed a more complex process, as this was not a field within the 
dataset. There existed several fields with information that aided, which are listed below 
(capitalized indicates the specific field within the GIMS or RAMS file): 
• Flashing lights (FLASHPAI > 0 OR MASTFLASH + OTHFLASH > 0) 
• Flashing lights on cantilever (CANTFLASHLANE + CANTFLASHNOT > 0) 
• Gate arms (REFLECTGATE + OTHGATE > 0 OR GATES > 0) 
• Power available (POWERAVAIL = 1) 
• Crossing angle (CROSSANGLE) 
• State highway system (STATESYS) 
• Federal functional classification (FEDFUNC) 
• Paved roadway (PAVEDHWY = 1) 
If any of the first three conditions were met, a self-created field was populated with a 
“TRUE” indication noting that this crossing likely included warning devices. If any of the 
bulleted fields changed from the first and last available year, different self-created fields were 
populated with a value of “1” (one) (overwriting a previous assumed “0” (zero) value) 
corresponding to each respective field. Crossings labeled with a “1” were cross-examined 
using Google Earth through the Google Street View feature, visually inspecting the crossing 
to update fields as needed. During this process, several additional fields of information were 
recorded, such as crossing length; indicators for flashing lights, gates, and cantilever beams; 
and data about the guardrail (type, number of sides, etc.). While the information given is 
valuable, additional information on the crossing pertinent to the study was needed for further 
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analysis. Although, the data from the years directly before (2006) and after (2017) were used 
to locate the crossings, they were not used in the analysis. 
Another quality control process involved inspecting the roadway files on concrete 
barriers and guardrail locations. If either were coded as being at a railroad crossing, they were 
examined in Google Earth to confirm, as most of these were in relation with grade-separated 
crossings.  
At the end of the construction, 1853 public at-grade crossings in Iowa were found to 
have active warning devices present during any period between 2007 and 2016. Crossings 
where the tracks were abandoned or removed, but the signals remained were still counted and 
analyzed in this study due to the potential impact they still may present. The inventory is based 
on the best available data provided and while variables such as traffic volume can vary over 
time, discrepancies within the datasets should have a minimal effect on the analyses. 
4.2.2 Crash Collection 
All crashes from the Iowa DOT database from 2007 to 2016 were linked to the nearest 
signalized railroad crossing (from the constructed inventory) using ArcGIS. While using the 
“join” feature in this software, distance to nearest linked crossing was also recorded. During 
the inventory’s construction, the item “crossing length” was calculated for each crossing using 
the measuring tool in Google Earth. This value represented the distance from the geocoded 
point representing the railroad crossing to the railroad signal mast. If there was guardrail, the 
length extended to the outer limits of the system.  
Figure 4.1 is a diagram outlying the procedure used to gather crashes. The red star 
indicates the GPS coordinates of the railroad crossing from the Iowa DOT GIMS file, the black 
“X” represents the railroad signal mast, the red lines show the presence of longitudinal 
guardrail, and the blue circle shows the buffer zone in which the crashes within this area were 
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(a) 
Railroad crossing with no guardrail. 
 
(b) 
Railroad crossing with longitudinal 
guardrail. 
Figure 4.1 Buffer zone radii used to collect crashes of interest. 
collected and analyzed for this study. This distance was restricted so that it would not include 
crashes not pertaining to the railroad crossing, such as on nearby perpendicular streets or at a 
closely located traffic signal. A filter was performed on all of the crashes to only include those 
that were within the crossing length. Another filter was applied to restrict the crashes to only 
include those that occurred during the time in which the crossing signals were present. Most 
of the crossings had signals for all ten years of the study, but 72 crossings were abandoned, 
removed, or blocked off having removed the signal masts from the former crossing and another 
41 were installed or upgraded from passive to active. 
 A sum of 1874 crashes were retrieved and represent the total crashes at the crossing. 
While these crashes may present insight in future railroad safety research, most of these crashes 
did not pertain to the research questions of interest in this study. Many of the crashes within 
the buffer zone involved rear-end collisions near the crossing or were undecipherable as to 
what was the main reason for the crash. 
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For this study, specific crashes were needed for analysis. Crashes relevant to the 
research objective were those that struck a railroad signal mast, a railroad controller box, or a 
barrier at the crossing. This all-inclusive group will here on be called “railroad-related”. 
Crashes involving driving through the gates (without damaging the signal mast), hitting a 
pedestrian, or colliding with a train were irrelevant for this study. Since neither of the railroad-
related crashes could be located strictly from the crash codes, law-enforcement narrative 
summaries of the crashes were requested.  
The crashes of interest were collected through various query searches and reviewing 
the crash code narratives. From the 1874 crashes within the radius of the crossing, 200 crashes 
did not contain a narrative. Filtered searches included variations and misspellings on the 
following words: railroad, train, crossing, pole, mast, signal, guardrail, and barrier. A total of 
156 railroad-related crashes were found and can be seen in Figure 4.2. Although train-vehicle 
collisions were not crashes of interest, they were still looked at for possible crashes that 
involved first striking the guardrail or signal mast. None of these crashes were found in this 
study. 
 
Figure 4.2 Map of the railroad-related crashes. 
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4.3 Data Summary 
4.3.1 Railroad Crossing Data 
A summary of the 1853 public grade active railroad crossings can be seen in Table 4.1. 
Crossing type describes the active warning devices used: flashing lights, gates, cantilever 
overhead structures with flashing lights, and the combinations between them. Barrier type 
describes the barrier, if there is one present, and if it is protecting both of the signal masts. 
There were several locations with other protective barriers, and this category included concrete 
barriers, concrete bollards, plastic barriers, wooden barriers, and wooden posts. Roadway type 
is the coded value from the state system field within the DOT’s railroad databases, where 
primary highways represent U.S. highways and numbered state highways and non-primary 
roads are under county or municipal jurisdiction. Rural and urban in this study represents 
whether or not the crossing is within city limits, also from the DOT’s railroad database. Traffic 
volumes were averaged amongst the available data for the crossing over the study period (2007 
to 2016). Within this study, traffic volumes (average annual daily traffic (AADT)) ranged from 
10 to 30,767. Previously mentioned in Section 4.2.2, crossing length reflects the distance 
between the coded coordinates and the furthest signal mast or the end of the protective barrier, 
if one is present, and is sorted into six categories.  
Table 4.1 Summary Railroad-Highway Crossing Statistics 
Statistic Count (Crossings) Percentage (%) 
Crossing Type 
Flashing light mast only 688 37.1 
Flashing light mast with gates only 855 46.1 
Flashing light mast with cantilever beam only 178 9.6 
Flashing light mast with gates & cantilever beam only 110 5.9 
Crossing type changes during study 22 1.2 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Statistic Count (Crossings) Percentage (%) 
Barrier Type 
No barrier 1595 86.1 
Barrier (any) on both sides only 161 8.7 
Barrier (any) on one side only 88 4.7 
Longitudinal guardrail on both sides only 126 6.8 
Longitudinal guardrail on one side only 7 0.4 
Ring-style guardrail on both sides only 29 1.6 
Ring-style guardrail on one side only 57 3.1 
Other barrier (e.g. concrete barriers, bollards) 29 1.6 
Multiple barriers used 1 0.1 
Barrier type changes during study 9 0.5 
Roadway Type 
Non-primary highway (county/local) 1682 90.8 
     Non-primary highway (rural) 595 32.1 
     Non-primary highway (urban) 1087 58.7 
Primary highway (state) 171 9.2 
     Primary highway (rural) 65 3.5 
     Primary highway (urban) 106 5.7 
Motor Vehicle Traffic Volume (AADT) 
0 – 299 403 21.7 
300 – 749  372 20.1 
750 – 1,499  368 19.9 
1,500 – 2,999 323 17.4 
3,000 – 7,499 264 14.2 
7,500 – 14,999 92 5.0 
15,000 + 31 1.7 
Crossing Length (Radius) 
    0 – 50 ft. 1256 67.8 
    51 – 75 ft. 336 18.1 
    76 – 100 ft. 178 9.6 
    101 – 150 ft. 69 3.7 
    151 – 200 ft. 13 0.7 
    201 – 250 ft. 1 0.1 
 
4.3.2 Crash Data 
Several fields within the crash-level file were valuable, including injury and crash 
severity, which were imperative to this study to evaluate crash risk and benefit-cost analysis. 
Crash severity is categorized on the KABCO scale that classifies each crash based upon the 
most severe injury sustained by any of the occupants within any of the vehicles involved in the 
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crash. There are five classifications: crashes that include a fatality (K), severe injury 
(incapacitating) (A), minor injury (non-incapacitating) (B), possible injury (C), and no injury 
or property damage only (PDO) (O). A fatality is defined as a death that resulted within 30 
days of the crash (Iowa DOT, 2015). To quantify these classifications for analysis, a five-point 
scale was used with 1 representing a fatal crash severity and 5 representing an uninjured or 
PDO crash severity.  
An initial investigation on the injury severity was conducted on the 156 crashes of 
interest (Table 4.2). Three of the crashes involved vehicles striking objects from multiple 
categories, two that hit a signal and guardrail and the other that hit a signal and additional 
railroad infrastructure. 
Table 4.2 Summary Crash Severity Statistics 
Crash Severity 
Crashes 
that hit 
railroad 
pole 
Crashes 
that hit 
guardrail 
or barrier 
Crashes 
that hit 
other 
railroad 
equipment 
All 
railroad-
related 
crashes 
Train into 
railroad 
apparatus 
or barrier 
crashes 
1 – K (fatal) 1 0 1* 1 0 
2 – A (serious injury) 4 0 0 4 2 
3 – B (minor injury) 10 2 1 13 2 
4 – C (possible injury) 21 3 1 25 2 
5 – O (Uninjured/PDO) 90 17* 8 113 2 
Average (1-5) 4.55 4.68 4.36 4.57 3.50 
TOTAL 126 22 11 156 8 
* Includes crashes that also struck railroad signal pole 
A statistically significant difference was not found between the severity of crashes 
where a vehicle struck a railroad signal mast (4.55) versus those that struck a guardrail or other 
barrier (4.68). The only significant differences came when comparing the crashes involving 
the train pushing the vehicle into a railroad apparatus. Only 13 crashes occurred when a train 
was or soon to be present, with two crashes resulting in minor injuries. Due to a small sample 
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of crashes that hit guardrail or other barrier, a comparison was also performed with all single-
vehicle guardrail collisions during the same time period (2007-2016) in Iowa on non-interstate 
roads in which guardrail (face or end) was a part of the sequence of events. The results yielded 
similar findings. The crash severity of collisions with the railroad signal masts also resembled 
similar distributions; a graph showing the three can be seen in Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3 Comparison of crash severity distribution between three types of crashes. 
A further investigation on different variables was conducted to see any relationships 
(Table 4.3). While the crossings with flashing lights and gates had more crashes, they had less 
severe injuries from these crashes. Vice versa, crossings with cantilevers had fewer crashes, 
but had more severe injuries related. Crossings that provided protection via a barrier in front 
of the signal mast saw a crash severity reduction. Rural roadways and non-primary highways 
were found to have higher severities. This is likely due to increased speeds associated on rural 
roadways, as it was found that as speed increased, the severity also increased. Driver 
demographics were also studied. Male drivers overrepresented the sample; however, there was 
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little difference in severity compared to female drivers. As the driver’s age increased, the crash 
severity was found to decrease. This is different from what would normally be expected. The 
results from past research indicated that older drivers (>55 years old) were found to have higher 
odds of injury (Gabauer & Gabler, 2010; Zou, Tarko, Chen, & Romero, 2014). Crashes tended 
to result in more severe injuries in cases where any of the airbags deployed. This finding is 
likely a result, in part, of the higher impact forces involved in such collisions rather than a 
reflection of the efficacy of the airbag. Twenty-five alcohol-involved crashes were found (there 
were zero crashes that involved other drugs) and a higher crash severity was associated. Only 
eight known distracted-driving crashes were traced, and it is expected that this is severely 
underestimated. Nevertheless, they did account for more severe crashes. Vehicle type was 
recoded to five major classifications to narrow down the broad categories. Commercial trucks 
(single-unit and tractor-trailers) were found to have less severe crashes than passenger vehicles 
(car, pick-up truck, mini-van). There was one motorcycle crash as a part of this study, which 
resulted in a severe injury, noting the previous concern to these motorists. The conditions of 
the roadway did not affect the crash severity much, but the sight visibility showed an increase 
in the severity. Lastly, it was found that crashes occurring at night (dusk to dawn) show a 
higher crash severity than those that occur during daylight hours. 
Seatbelt use was also looked at, but at a person-level basis instead of a crash-level one. 
A seatbelt usage rate of 91.6% was found for the persons involved in a railroad-related crash. 
In 2017, it was reported that Iowa had a seatbelt usage rate of 91.4% (National Center for 
Statistics and Analysis, 2018, June, revised). Of the 186 total occupants involved in this study, 
the injury severity for those not restrained was 3.00 with one fatality and three severe injuries. 
In comparison, those that were restrained had an injury severity of 4.60 with one severe injury. 
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The occupants for which restrained use was unknown, the injury severity was 4.77 with one 
severe injury.  
Table 4.3 Average Crash Severity across Various Factors  
Statistic 
Railroad-
Related 
Crashes 
Percentage 
(%) 
Average Crash 
Severity (1 – 5) 
Crossing Type 
Flashing light mast only 46 29.5 4.52 
Flashing light mast with gates only 76 48.7 4.66 
Flashing light mast with cantilever beam only 17 10.9 4.41 
Flashing light mast with gates & cantilever beam only 14 9.0 4.36 
Gates present (w/ or w/out cantilever beam) 90 58.3 4.61 
Cantilever beam present (w/ or w/out gates) 31 19.9 4.39 
Barrier Type 
No barrier 109 69.9 4.50 
Barrier (any) on both sides only 20 12.8 4.70 
Barrier (any) on one side only 14 9.0 4.85 
Longitudinal guardrail on both sides only 20 12.8 4.70 
Longitudinal guardrail on one side only 3 1.9 5.00 
Ring-style guardrail on both sides only 0 0.0 N/A 
Ring-style guardrail on one side only 10 6.4 4.80 
Other barrier (e.g. concrete barriers, bollards) 1 0.6 5.00 
Roadway Type 
Non-primary highway (county/local) 136 87.2 4.54 
     Non-primary highway (rural) 48 30.8 4.46 
     Non-primary highway (urban) 88 56.4 4.59 
Primary highway (state) 20 12.8 4.75 
     Primary highway (rural) 11 7.1 4.73 
     Primary highway (urban) 9 5.8 4.78 
All rural roads 59 37.8 4.51 
All urban roads 97 62.2 4.61 
Speed Limit (mph) 
30 or under 63 40.4 4.70 
35 – 45 50 32.1 4.50 
50 or greater 43 27.6 4.47 
Driver Gender 
Male 108 69.2 4.56 
Female 36 23.1 4.58 
Unknown 12 7.7 4.67 
Driver Age 
12 – 20 25 16.0 4.52 
21 – 35 53 34.0 4.59 
36 – 59 46 29.5 4.63 
60 or older 20 12.8 4.65 
Unknown 12 7.7 4.67 
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Table 4.3 continued  
 
 
Statistic 
Railroad-
Related 
Crashes 
Percentage 
(%) 
Average Crash 
Severity (1 – 5) 
Airbag Deployment 
All or some airbags deployed 35 22.4 4.06 
No airbags deployed 104 66.7 4.76 
Unknown 17 10.9 4.47 
Alcohol Involved 
Yes (known) 25 16.0 4.12 
No or unknown 131 84.0 4.66 
Distracted Driving Involved 
Yes (known) 8 5.1 4.38 
No or unknown 148 94.9 4.58 
Vehicle Type 
Passenger vehicle (car, pick-up truck, mini-van) 111 71.2 4.45 
Farm vehicle 4 2.6 5.00 
Motorcycle 1 0.6 2.00 
Small truck (single unit) 7 4.5 4.86 
Large truck (tractor-trailer) 30 19.2 4.97 
Unknown 3 1.9 4.67 
Weather Conditions 
Clear or cloudy 99 63.5 4.59 
Precipitation (falling or on roadway) 48 30.8 4.56 
Sight restricted (fog, blowing sand) 9 5.8 4.44 
Time of Day 
Day (light) 90 57.7 4.64 
Night (dark) 63 40.4 4.44 
Unknown 3 1.9 5.00 
TOTAL 156 100.0 4.57 
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CHAPTER 5.    METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Crash Rate Analysis 
A simple comparison of the number of crashes occurring between various types of at-
grade crossings provides limited insights as to the safety performance of these configurations. 
A more meaningful comparison considers the rates of crashes, normalized by exposure levels 
(i.e. traffic volumes). A crash rate analysis was therefore performed on the crashes that 
pertained to railroad infrastructure. The rate was calculated using Equation 1, which treated 
the roadway as an intersection since the segments of roadway are very short (less than 0.1 
miles). The exposure is expressed through the number of motor vehicles crossing the facility, 
and due to the magnitude, the value is presented in units that can be more easily understood 
(e.g. crashes per 100 million entering vehicles). 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 100,000,000 × 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖365 × 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 × 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖                                                                                                (1) 
In this equation, Ri expresses the crash rate in terms of the number of crashes per 
hundred million crossing vehicles (HMCV) at crossing i. Futhermore, Ci is the total number of 
crashes, Ni is the number of years, and Vi is the daily motor vehicle traffic volumes (both 
directions) during the study period in which crossing i had active warning devices. To find the 
average crash rates by different aggregations, Equation 2 was used. 
𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 = 100,000,000 × ∑(𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗)∑(365 × 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 × 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗)                                                                                         (2) 
 Rj is the number of crashes per HMCV of combination j and the denominator is the 
summation of the crossing vehicles of crossings i that are a part of combination j. This 
calculation accounts for the crossings, which are not present for all ten years within the study. 
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5.2 Statistical Modeling 
Misleading results could occur if correlated independent variables are not accounted 
for with count analysis data such as with crash rates. Using a statistical modeling approach 
allows simultaneous interactions between the factors and disaggregate the variables, as well as 
describe the significance and relevance of the variable on the dependent variable.  
5.2.1 Crash Rate Model 
A negative binomial model is chosen to estimate the combined effects due to the 
discrete, non-negative integer crash data. Other count models exist, such as a Poisson 
regression, but because crash data tends to exhibit a variance that is significantly greater than 
the mean, a negative binomial model is often used as it overcomes the dispersion. As a result, 
the expected number of crashes (λ) at crossing i can be calculated using Equation 3. 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)                                                                                               (3) 
In this equation, Xi is a vector of predictor variables (e.g. AADT, presence of gates, 
presence of cantilever beam, urban/rural locale) expected to influence the number of crashes 
occurring at location i, β is a vector of parameter estimates associated with these variables, and 
εi is the gamma-distributed error term (also called the overdispersion parameter) with mean of 
one and variance of α. The model is estimated using the standard maximum likelihood method.  
5.2.2 Crash Severity Model 
Injury and crash severity values are based on the police-reported KABCO rating scale, 
which are ordinal in nature. A common method for analyzing this type of dataset due to its 
simplicity and ease of interpretation is the ordered logit model (Savolainen, Mannering, Lord, 
& Quddus, 2011). Savolainen et al. noted that sample size is an important factor affecting the 
performance of the model and simpler models may be preferred for smaller samples. There has 
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been a few different viewpoints on the size of a small sample with injury severity data: 200 
with an absolute minimum of 100 (Lord, 2006) and 1000 (Ye & Lord, 2014), with both studies 
stating that crash severity models should not be estimated with sample sizes smaller than their 
respective values. 
5.3 Roadside Safety Analysis Program 
Given the limited number of crashes that involved striking a railroad warning signal 
device, guardrail or other protective barrier, or other railroad related infrastructure at the 
crossing, the use of simulation software was utilized to further estimate the impacts on the 
likelihood of a crash occurring. For this study, the Roadside Safety Analysis Program (RSAP) 
Version 3 (RSAP 3.0.1 release 150507) was chosen to evaluate the crossings. This is the latest 
version of this software, which was developed under NCHRP Project 22-27, completed in 
2012. RSAP was also utilized to analyze benefit-cost ratios for different alternatives.  
5.3.1 Scenario 
A two-lane rural highway was chosen as the roadway to compare. The design was based 
off the most generic situation in which a decision to implement guardrail would be made. The 
roadway and project information are shown in Table 5.1. Many of the default values within 
the software were selected. When they were chosen over a known value, they are noted with 
an asterisk. 
A rate of return (otherwise referred to as discount rate) remained at the default (4%), 
as this was consistent with Iowa DOT policy (Iowa DOT, 2018b). The design life of guardrail 
was changed from 25 to 15 years as this is the value the Iowa DOT uses (Iowa DOT, 2018b). 
Although, the service life for railroad signals and warning devices is currently 10 years, it was 
decided to use 15 years, as this is the lifecycle of the treatment being tested. The value of 
statistical life (VSL) is defined as “the average comprehensive crash cost of a fatal crash” in 
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Table 5.1 Project Characteristics Used in the RSAP Model 
Characteristic Value or Description 
Project Information 
Design life 15 years 
Construction year 2019 
Rate of return (discount rate) 4 % 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator 1.07 (*) 
Value of Statistical Life (VSL) 
$6.2 million (2018 USD) 
$5.4 million (min.) (2015 USD) 
$13.4 million (max.) (2015 USD) 
Encroachment Adjustment 1 (*) 
Decision point benefit-cost ratio 2.00 
Roadway Information 
Roadway type Rural primary highway 
Terrain Flat 
Divided or Undivided Undivided 
Number of lanes (total in both directions) 2 
Posted speed limit 55 mph 
Construction Average Annual Daily 
Traffic (AADT) 
1,000 
2,500 
5,000 
Annual traffic growth rate 1 % 
Percent of traffic in primary direction 50 % (*) 
Percent trucks 10 % (*) 
Lane width 12 ft. (*) 
Shoulder width 3 ft. 
Segment length 500 ft. 
Lateral distance between signals 75 ft. 
 
the RSAP User’s Manual (RoadSafe LLC, 2012a). In Iowa, the cost per fatality is $4.5 million 
(Harmon, Bahar, & Gross, 2018; Iowa DOT, 2018b). Between 2007 and 2016, the average 
occupancy per vehicle involved in any crash within Iowa in which there was at least one 
occupant was 1.38. If all occupants within a fatal crash suffer a fatality, the cost per fatal crash 
(i.e. the VSL) would be equal to $6.2 million. Two exact same models were generated to 
account for the recognized uncertainty of the VSL, using the recommended minimum and 
maximum alternative estimates of $5.4 million and $13.4 million, respectively (Moran & 
Monje, 2016). 
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The average traffic volume on rural, primary highways from the railroad inventory was 
approximately 2500 vehicles per day and was used in the analysis. To study the impacts with 
varying volumes, AADTs of 1000 and 5000 were also studied. AADT values larger than 5000 
were not analyzed due to the unnatural encroachment frequency curve (see Figure 5.1). An 
annual traffic growth rate of 1% was used as this was the default value in the Benefit/Cost 
Worksheet for the Iowa DOT (Iowa DOT, 2018b); the mid-life AADT was therefore used in 
the analysis. Primary directional traffic remained at 50% since it is the general case and each 
location will be site-specific. The percent of traffic encroaching right was left at 50% since this 
value is difficult to calculate with certainty and still varies on the location. The default values 
for the vehicle fleet were maintained, which included 70% passenger cars, 20% pick-up truck, 
4% average single-unit truck, and 6% average tractor-trailer.  
 
Source: (RoadSafe LLC, 2012b) 
Figure 5.1 Encroachment module used in RSAP v3. 
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5.3.2 Alternatives 
Five alternatives were created and tested to find the effects of their designs. Table 5.2 
details the conditions of each alternative and Figure 5.2 shows them as they appear within the 
software. Two different signaling systems were tested, a railroad flashing light mast (with or 
without gates) and a breakaway railroad flashing light mast. Since neither of these specific 
devices are readily available within the software, a general fixed object and breakaway sign 
were substituted, respectively. The radius used for the signal mast represented the distance 
from the center of the pole to the outer edge of the flashing light assembly. This value was 
found to vary from 25 inches (WSDOT, 2018) to 27 inches (MDOT, 2009), so the average (26 
inches) was used. Two different horizontal offsets for the signals were analyzed, 6 and 10 feet. 
Six feet matches the minimum requirement of the MUTCD in Chapter 8C (FHWA, 2009). 
While the maximum distance the signal can be offset is not explicitly mentioned in the 
MUTCD, Michigan DOT uses a value of 10 feet in their R-122-C design as a maximum 
(MDOT, 2009). Using the 10-foot value allows the signal mast to have the 5-foot clearance 
guideline from face of guardrail (Iowa DOT, 2017).  
Table 5.2 RSAP Alternatives 
Condition Alt. 1  (a) 
Alt. 2 
 (b) 
Alt. 3 
 (c) 
Alt. 4  
(d) 
Alt. 5  
(e) 
Railroad signal mast? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               Breakaway? No No Yes No No 
Offset from edge of traveled way 6 ft. 10 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 10 ft. 
Longitudinal guardrail? No No No Yes Yes 
Offset from edge of traveled way N/A N/A N/A 5 ft. 5 ft. 
 
Two alternatives included longitudinal guardrail systems, which followed the BA-253 
design. There only exists one semi-rigid guardrail design within RSAP (W-Beam), which was 
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selected for this analysis. If guardrail was included, an offset of 5 feet from the traveled way 
was used to meet the preferred minimum (Iowa DOT, 2017). RSAP only includes one generic 
end terminal, and this was used. 
 
Figure 5.2 Diagram of the five alternatives used in the analysis. 
 
 (a) 
Alternative 1 
 
 
(b)  
Alternative 2 
 
(c) 
Alternative 3 
 
(d)  
Alternative 4 
 
(e) 
Alternative 5 
 
Legend 
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5.3.3 Costs 
A major influencer in the benefit-cost analysis is the costs associated with each type of 
crash. The data in Table 5.3 was requested from the Iowa DOT and reflects various sources 
used to calculate the proper assessments of installation, maintenance, and repair costs. The 
figure is broken down into guardrail, railroad signal masts, and breakaway railroad signals. For 
each case, the values were combined for the features included in the alternative. These values 
then overwrote the preset values that were included in the generic RSAP software. The 
maintenance and repair costs for the breakaway railroad signal are based on breakaway traffic 
signals, and the installation cost is assumed to be comparative to the railroad signal. 
Table 5.3 Costs Used for RSAP Analysis 
Item Average Installation Cost 
Average Annual 
Maintenance 
Average Typical 
Repair Cost per 
Crash 
Guardrail 
Flaggers $1,700/day – 2 day N/A $1,700/day – 1 day 
Railroad insurance $6,000 – Lump Sum N/A $6,000 – Lump Sum 
Guardrail  $6,600 $1,000 $1,710 
TOTAL $16,000 $1,000 $9,410 
Railroad Signal Mast 
Flaggers N/A N/A $1,700/day – 1 day 
Railroad insurance N/A N/A $6,000 – Lump Sum 
Signal system (base) $5,000 $50,000 
TOTAL $0 $5,000 $57,700 
Breakaway Railroad Signal 
Flaggers N/A N/A $1,700/day – 1 day 
Railroad insurance N/A N/A $6,000 – Lump Sum 
Signal system $0 (to upgrade) $10,000 $20,000 
TOTAL $0 $10,000 $27,700 
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CHAPTER 6.    RESULTS 
The results of this study aimed at helping transportation engineers understand the in-
service evaluation of guardrail at signalized railroad crossings and look at areas for refining 
roadside design, improving safety, and minimizing the lifecycle costs associated. 
6.1 Crash Rate 
Crash rate analyses have been performed at railroad-highway at-grade crossings 
through several studies (Meeker, Fox, & Weber, 1997; Lenné, et al., 2011; Raub, 2006), but 
focus only on the collision rate between trains and motor vehicles. No research was found on 
the prevalence of crashes occurring near railroad crossings, nor with the signal mast or any 
safety barriers potentially guarding it. While active crossings (controlled by warning devices 
such as flashing lights and gates) have shown lower collision rates with trains compared to 
passive crossings (controlled by devices such as cross bucks, yield signs, and stop signs), it is 
unclear whether they may contribute to more crashes, or more specifically more crashes with 
the signal mast itself.  
The combined average crash rate was found to be 12.93 crashes per HMCV. This value 
represents all of the reported crashes between the signal masts or guardrail, if present, at a 
railroad-highway at-grade crossing on a public road within the state of Iowa. The first 
comparison looked at the difference between the signal system with and without the presence 
of a longitudinal guardrail on both sides (Table 6.1).  
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Table 6.1 Crash Rate Comparison between Signal Systems with and without Longitudinal 
Guardrail Installations on Both Sides 
Signal System 
 
Without Any Barriers 
 
With Longitudinal 
Guardrail 
Number of 
Crossings 
Railroad-
Related 
Crashes per 
HMCV 
Number of 
Crossings 
Railroad-
Related 
Crashes per 
HMCV 
Flashing lights only 594 1.30 54 2.20 
Flashing lights and gates only 752 1.31 36 2.86 
Flashing lights and cantilever beam only 143 0.32 21 1.30 
Flashing lights with gates and cantilever 
beam 90 0.61 12 1.32 
 
Several other factors from the inventory were examined to explore their influence on 
crash rates (Table 6.2). To compare more accurately, crossings that changed during the study 
were removed from their respective group.  
Crossings with flashing lights and gates only were found to have the highest number 
of crashes, number of railroad-related crashes, and railroad-related crash rate among the four 
different types of crossings. Some 65% of the railroad-related crashes at flashing-lights-and-
gates-only crossings occurred where there was no guardrail or barrier provided; however, the 
corresponding crash rate was lower, only 1.31, meaning that protection devices increase the 
railroad-related crash rate. Cantilevers are normally installed at locations with sight visibility 
issues, nearby traffic signals, high speeds (either roadway or railway), or have higher exposure 
to crashes (i.e. high traffic volumes). In these cases, a higher crash rate might be expected; 
however, crossing with flashing-lights-and-cantilever-beam-only had the lowest railroad-
related crash rate at 0.46 per HMCV. This could suggest that the cantilever beam is performing 
well in regards to making drivers aware of the crossing, or that since the structure is more rigid, 
a number of unreported crashes could be occurring that are not included in this analysis. 
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Additionally, cantilevers are often used on multi-lane roadways, where vehicles in some lanes 
must be severely out of position to hit the structure. 
Table 6.2 Crash Rates of Several Aggregations 
Group 
Number 
of 
Crossings 
Number 
of 
Crashes 
Railroad-
Related 
Crashes 
Crashes 
per 
HMCV 
Railroad-
Related 
Crashes 
per 
HMCV 
Crossing Type 
Flashing light mast only 688 378 46 10.77 1.31 
Flashing light mast with gates only 855 587 76 13.04 1.69 
Flashing light mast with cantilever 
beam only 178 493 17 13.20 0.46 
Flashing light mast with gates & 
cantilever beam only 110 318 14 15.15 0.67 
Gates present (w/ or w/out cantilever 
beam) 965 905 90 13.71 1.36 
Cantilever beam present (w/ or 
w/out gates) 288 811 31 13.90 0.53 
Barrier Type 
No barrier 1595 1526 109 12.55 0.90 
Barrier (any) on both sides only 161 170 20 13.30 1.56 
Barrier (any) on one side only 88 157 14 16.83 1.50 
Longitudinal guardrail on both sides 
only 126 150 20 14.07 1.88 
Longitudinal guardrail on one side 
only 7 81 3 26.78 0.99 
Ring-style guardrail on both sides 
only 29 15 0 9.95 0.00 
Ring-style guardrail on one side 
only 57 63 10 15.26 2.42 
Other barrier (e.g. concrete barriers, 
bollards) 29 17 1 6.14 0.36 
Roadway Type 
Non-primary highway (county/local) 1682 1460 136 12.80 1.19 
     Non-primary highway (rural) 595 257 48 18.68 3.49 
     Non-primary highway (urban) 1087 1203 88 11.99 0.88 
Primary highway (state) 171 414 20 13.39 0.65 
     Primary highway (rural) 65 83 11 13.00 1.72 
     Primary highway (urban) 106 331 9 13.19 0.37 
All rural roads 660 340 59 16.88 2.93 
All urban roads 1193 1534 97 12.29 0.78 
TOTAL 1853 1874 156 12.93 1.08 
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For a crash to be labeled as railroad-related, the vehicle would have had to leave the 
roadway. In the action of driving over the railroad tracks, when longitudinal guardrail is 
present, the range for a vehicle to leave the roadway and get involved in one of these crashes 
increases, therefore increasing the likelihood for such a crash to be labeled in this manner. This 
is evident in the findings as the railroad-related crash rates where there is longitudinal guardrail 
or any protection on both sides are greater than them being only on one side. Ring-style 
guardrail on only one side experienced the highest railroad-related crash rate (2.42), which 
may be due to a series of crashes involving trucks making sharp or wide turns into or out of 
commercial driveways located adjacent to signal devices. 
There was considerable difference between the roadway classifications as well as 
between roadway locations (rural/urban). Primary highways, those maintained by the state, had 
less than 13% of the total railroad-related crashes and a crash rate nearly half of the secondary 
roadways. Meanwhile, urban roads had over 60% of the railroad-related crashes but rural roads 
had a crash rate three times as high. On urban roads, vehicles are generally traveling at slower 
speeds and are more inclined to be prepared to stop, even unexpectedly; whereas vehicles on 
rural roads may not fully comprehend what the traffic signal represents or may not see a vehicle 
slowing down (or stopped) at the crossing until it is too late and have to make an evasive 
maneuver. Other circumstances, such as weather conditions in rural areas may also have an 
effect on vehicles being able to maintain control, with or without a train present.  
A negative binomial model was used to estimate the number of crashes that involving 
striking a railroad signal support (Table 6.3). Variables similar to those used with the crash 
rates were chosen to look at potential combined effects. Total traffic volume was used instead 
of the AADT to account for crossings that were not in the study for all ten years. This exposure 
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measure was included in log-form in the regression model as it improved the model’s 
goodness-of-fit.  
Table 6.3 Results of Negative Binomial Model for Crashes Striking Railroad Signal Masts 
Term Estimate Std. Error Chi Square p-value 
Intercept -12.300 1.476 69.451 <0.0001 
Ln (Total Traffic Volume) 0.656 0.098 44.508 <0.0001 
Gates not installed (base) - - - - 
Gates installed 0.337 0.179 3.530 0.0603 
Cantilever beam not installed (base) - - - - 
Cantilever beam installed -0.602 0.207 8.481 0.0036 
Inside city limits – Rural (base) - - - - 
Outside city limits – Urban -0.848 0.251 11.440 0.0007 
Dispersion 3.675 1.093 11.302 0.0008 
 
As expected, as traffic volumes increased, the likelihood of a crash also increased. 
Crashes tended to be less frequent if cantilevers were installed at a crossing. Contrarily, if gates 
were present, more crashes with signal supports occurred, though this result was not 
statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval. When looking at the roadway type, the 
classification (primary vs. non-primary) was not significant, but where the roadway was 
located (rural vs. urban) did have an effect. Roads within city limits were found to have a lower 
likelihood of crashes with railroad signals. A graph visualizing the eight possible combinations 
can be seen in Figure 6.1. Total traffic volume was converted back to AADT to simplify the 
interpretation of the graph. 
Two additional negative binomial models were constructed that included the presence 
of longitudinal guardrail. The statistical models showed that the guardrail was significant in 
reducing the number of crashes with railroad signals. However, it was found that guardrail’s 
effect is insignificant in reducing the total railroad apparatus crashes. Reductions in signal mast 
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crashes are therefore offset by the additional crashes with the guardrail. This makes sense, 
since the presence of a guardrail system is designed to absorb those crashes. 
 
Figure 6.1 Estimated railroad signal mast strikes per 10 years given traffic volume. 
6.2 Crash Severity 
An ordered logit regression model was used to find variables that were statistically 
significant in effecting the severity of a railroad-related crash. Many variables were tested, 
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including roadway characteristics such as speed limit and traffic volume, driver characteristics 
such as age, gender, seating position, number of occupants, alcohol use, and whether or not 
they were distracted, as well as the type of crash and weather conditions. None of these 
variables, however, were statistically significant. Table 6.4 reveals the results of the model, 
which includes three variables: seatbelt use, airbag deployment, and vehicle type.  
Table 6.4 Results of Ordered Logit Model for Railroad-Related Crashes 
Term Estimate Std. Error 
Chi 
Square p-value 
A – Intercept -3.510 0.851 17.01 <0.0001 
B – Intercept -1.075 0.564 3.64 0.0565 
C – Intercept 0.235 0.560 0.18 0.6750 
O – Intercept 6.953 1.208 33.14 <0.0001 
Seatbelt Not Used 1.761 0.463 14.48 0.0001 
Seatbelt Used (base) - - - - 
Airbag Not Deployed -0.928 0.251 13.64 0.0002 
Airbag Deployed (base) - - - - 
Passenger vehicle (car, pick-up, mini-van) 1.079 0.499 4.67 0.0307 
Commercial truck (single-unit, tractor-trailer) (base) - - - - 
 
Due to the limited known data about seatbelt use at the person-level, nearly half of the 
data was excluded (102 of 186 total occupants involved), severely restraining the application 
of these results and excluded the sole fatality from the dataset. The findings though do show 
consistent results with other research as passengers wearing a seatbelt and those that did not 
have an airbag deploy received a lower severity (Schneider, Savolainen, & Zimmerman, 2009). 
Heavier vehicles (i.e. commercial trucks) also received reduced severities. The only term 
included in the model that was not significant at a 90% confidence level was possible injury, 
which could suggest that this category includes a good mix of injuries and non-injuries.  
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6.3 RSAP 
To completely remove biased results from an in-service performance evaluation, both 
reported and unreported crashes would need to be analyzed (Mak & Sicking, 2002). 
Unreported crashes need to be considered because they represent the “successes” of the 
roadside safety treatment, as these crashes likely result in neither injury nor serious property 
damage. Studies have attempted to estimate the number of unreported collisions based on 
maintenance records (Carlson, Allison, & Bryden, 1978), video camera surveillance 
(Fitzpatrick, Hancock, & Ray, 1999), and periodical inspections (Ray & Weir, 2001; Galati, 
1967). It is expensive and quite difficult to calculate or collect data on unreported crashes. For 
this study, RSAP was used to both estimate total crashes and the costs associated in a particular 
scenario.  
After running the RSAP models using the conditions covered in Table 5.2 and Figure 
5.2, several summary reports were derived. In the Segment and Alternative Cost Summary 
information on the annual expected number of crashes, annual repair costs, and annual crash 
costs was included. From the estimated crashes, the crash rate in terms of crashes per HMCV 
was calculated using Equation 1. With varying VSLs only the annual crash costs were effected 
and follow a linear relationship. Table 6.5 details the results from the models. The AADTs 
shown in the table correspond to the construction and mid-life values. 
In each alternative, the number of crashes increased with increased traffic volumes, but 
the rate of increase decreased as AADT increased. Thus, the crash rates decreased with higher 
traffic volumes. This can be visualized in Figure 6.2. Alternatives 1 and 3 have the same 
estimated number of crashes and crash rate, which are overlapped in the figure. 
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Table 6.5 Estimated Crashes from RSAP 
Alt. AADT Crashes Per Year 
Crash Rate 
(per HMCV) 
Annual 
Repair Costs VSL 
Annual 
Crash Costs 
1 
10001077 0.00875 2.2259 $505 
$5.4 M $1,344 
$6.2 M $1,494 
$13.4 M $3,335 
25002694 0.01558 1.5844 $899 
$5.4 M $2,392 
$6.2 M $2,660 
$13.4 M $5,936 
50005387 0.01786 0.9083 $1,030 
$5.4 M $2,742 
$6.2 M $3,049 
$13.4 M $6,804 
2 
10001077 0.00791 2.0122 $456 
$5.4 M $1,099 
$6.2 M $1,222 
$13.4 M $2,727 
25002694 0.01408 1.4319 $812 
$5.4 M $1,956 
$6.2 M $2,175 
$13.4 M $4,854 
50005387 0.01613 0.8203 $931 
$5.4 M $2,242 
$6.2 M $2,493 
$13.4 M $5,563 
3 
10001077 0.00875 2.2259 $242 
$5.4 M $134 
$6.2 M $149 
$13.4 M $333 
25002694 0.01558 1.5844 $432 
$5.4 M $239 
$6.2 M $266 
$13.4 M $594 
50005387 0.01786 0.9083 $495 
$5.4 M $274 
$6.2 M $305 
$13.4 M $680 
4 
10001077 0.03308 8.4151 $557 
$5.4 M $1,892 
$6.2 M $2,104 
$13.4 M $4,695 
25002694 0.05888 5.9879 $991 
$5.4 M $3,368 
$6.2 M $3,745 
$13.4 M $8,358 
50005387 0.06749 3.4324 $1,136 
$5.4 M $3,860 
$6.2 M $4,293 
$13.4 M $9,579 
5 
10001077 0.03363 8.5550 $498 
$5.4 M $1,613 
$6.2 M $1,794 
$13.4 M $4,003 
25002694 0.05985 6.0866 $887 
$5.4 M $2,871 
$6.2 M $3,193 
$13.4 M $7,125 
50005387 0.06860 3.4889 $1,017 
$5.4 M $3,291 
$6.2 M $3,660 
$13.4 M $8,167 
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Figure 6.2 Estimated railroad-related crashes per 10 years and crash rates using RSAP. 
When looking at the annual repair costs, all of the alternatives appear to be relatively 
similar except Alternative 3 (see Figure 6.3). It is possible that the predicted repair costs for 
this alternative are underestimated, meaning that it could approach the other four. 
 
Figure 6.3 Estimated annual repair costs by traffic volumes using RSAP. 
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The price put on the VSL is very critical to the benefit-cost analysis. The maximum 
acceptable value is nearly 2.5 times that of the minimum, allowing for various interpretations. 
The VSL for the Iowa DOT is nearly comparable to the minimum value, a little over $630,000 
in estimated 2019 USD. The calculated annual crash costs with the different VSLs are graphed 
in Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5, and Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.4 Estimated annual crash costs using a VSL of $5.4 million (2015 USD). 
 
Figure 6.5 Estimated annual crash costs using a VSL of $6.2 million (2018 USD). 
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Figure 6.6 Estimated annual crash costs using a VSL of $13.4 million (2015 USD).  
Although the two alternatives that provided guardrail protection to the signal mast had 
higher repair and crash costs, when considering the average cost per crash these alternatives 
had much lower costs than the two without guardrail (see Figure 6.7). This value was calculated 
by dividing the annual crash costs by the annual number of crashes and averaged over the three 
AADTs. Each AADT was not represented because they did not fluctuate more than $200. 
 
Figure 6.7 Average costs per crash at each alternative with different VSLs. 
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All the costs thus far have been representing one individual crossing. Within this study, 
there were 65 crossings on rural primary highways with 16 not having a barrier and the other 
49 having longitudinal guardrail. Using Table 6.5’s crash rates it is possible to predict the 
number of crashes. It can be assumed that crossings without guardrail follow Alternative 1 and 
crossings with guardrail follow Alternative 4, as these are the most closely related alternatives 
to each case. The 65 crossings were split up by AADT values to calculate the estimated 
unreported crashes and costs on state jurisdiction roads. Using the three data points (1000, 
2500, and 5000), the mid-point in each category was used to divide the crossings.  
Two methods exist for calculating the predicting crashes: 
• Using the estimated annual crashes per crossing (Table 6.5) and multiplying by 
the number of crossings that correspond to the category and the number of years 
in the study; for results, see Table 6.6. 
• Using the estimated crash rate (Table 6.5) and the actual AADT values, 
Equation 2 can be utilized to solve for Ci, which would, in this case, represent 
the predicted number of crashes; for results, see Table 6.7.  
Table 6.6 Comparison of Predicted and Actual Results for 10 Years Using Estimated Crashes 
Category 
# of 
Crossings 
Crashes Crash Rate (per HMCV) 
Est. 
Annual 
Repair 
Costs 
Est. Annual 
Crash Costs 
(VSL = 
$6.2M) 
Guard-
rail AADT Est. Actual Est. Actual 
No 
< 1750 6 0.5 2 2.23 9.24 $3,030 $8,964 
1751-3750 8 1.2 1 1.58 1.43 $7,192 $21,280 
>3751 2 0.4 1 0.91 0.85 $2,060 $6,098 
Yes 
< 1750 23 7.4 1 8.42 0.90 $12,421 $46,919 
1751-3750 19 10.3 4 5.99 2.55 $17,343 $65,538 
>3751 7 4.7 2 3.43 1.24 $7,952 $30,051 
No Guardrail Total 16 2.1 4 1.50 1.91 $12,282 $36,342 
Guardrail Total 49 22.4 7 5.64 1.63 $37,716 $142,508 
TOTAL 65 24.5 11 4.55 1.72 $49,998 $178,850 
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Table 6.7 Comparison of Predicted and Actual Results for 10 Years Using Estimated Crash 
Rate 
Category # of 
Crossings 
Predicted 
Crashes  
Actual 
Crashes 
Est. Annual 
Crash Costs 
(VSL = $6.2M) Guardrail AADT 
No 
< 1750 6 0.5 2 $8,228 
1751-3750 8 1.1 1 $18,941 
>3751 2 1.1 1 $18,259 
Yes 
< 1750 23 9.3 1 $57,394 
1751-3750 19 9.4 4 $54,978 
>3751 7 5.6 2 $35,341 
No Guardrail Total 16 3.1 4 $45,428 
Guardrail Total 49 24.2 7 $147,713 
TOTAL 65 27.3 11 $193,140 
 
The difference in the two methods lies in the number of crossing vehicles (CV) used. 
In Table 6.6, the CV value used originated from the RSAP predicted, calculated by taking the 
mid-life volume multiplied by the number of years, 365, and the number of crossings. Table 
6.7 used the actual experienced AADT in place of the mid-life traffic volume. Crash rates and 
estimated maintenance remained the same, so they were left off Table 6.7. Since the predicted 
crashes changed, the estimated annual crash costs had to be adjusted. To calculate the new 
crash costs, the average crash costs per crash (Figure 6.7) was multiplied by the predicted 
crashes. 
Research has found that crashes involving guardrail are severely underestimated at any 
location. The rate of unreported guardrail strikes ranges from 59 percent (Ray & Weir, 2001) 
to 90 percent (Galati, 1967; Carlson, Allison, & Bryden, 1978; Ray & Hopp, 2000). It can be 
believed that the crashes that are reported are only those that result in more severe impacts 
(injuries or disabled vehicles), which fails to provide the actual likelihood of a vehicle striking 
the barrier or in other locations, striking the signal mast. Within the railroad-related crashes, 
there were 22 reported cases where guardrail or other protection device was struck. As the 
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previous research suggests, for a reporting rate between 10 and 41 percent, 32 to 198 crashes 
could have gone unreported, respectively. It could be estimated that the actual crash rates in 
this study would then be between 13.15 and 14.29 per HMCV for all crashes and between 1.30 
and 2.44 per HMCV for railroad-related crashes. If only 6 percent of all guardrail crashes result 
in serious injury or fatality (Michie & Bronstad, 1994), this would suggest that between 3 and 
13 crashes of this nature would be expected. There were five such crashes found in this study 
and based on this assumption there would be an expected 61 unreported guardrail crashes. 
Upon investigation, unreported crashes were present in this study and found through the quality 
control stage. Damage was found at several crossings either on the signal support or on the 
protection device. Eight of those crossings failed to record a railroad-related crash during the 
study, meaning that the crash was either unreported or failed to provide a narrative of the 
circumstances. An example of a crossing that had visible damage with no corresponding 
crashes can be seen in Figure 6.8.  
 
Photo: Google Maps (Google, 2011b) 
Figure 6.8 Example of guardrail damage at a crossing that had no railroad-related crashes 
during the study period.  
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 If we assume the number of predicted crashes that RSAP generates to be a true value, 
an estimated reporting rate can be calculated. This can be done by dividing the actual crashes 
by the predicted crashes and be displayed in the form of a percentage. The results can be seen 
in Table 6.8. The estimated reporting rate at crossings without guardrail was found to over 
100% (i.e. more crashes happened than predicted). This suggests that these crashes are quite 
likely to be reported, if they occur. On the other hand, crossings with guardrail exhibited 
reporting rates between 28.9% and 31.2%, falling within the range of previous research. 
Table 6.8 Estimated Reporting Rates for Rural Primary Highways 
Category 
Predicted 
Crashes by 
Estimated 
Crashes 
Predicted 
Crashes by 
Crash Rate 
Actual 
Crashes 
Estimated 
Reporting Rate 
(%) Guardrail AADT 
No 
< 1750 0.5 0.5 2 381.0 – 415.0 
1751-3750 1.2 1.1 1 80.2 – 90.1 
>3751 0.4 1.1 1 93.5 – 280.0 
Yes 
< 1750 7.4 9.3 1 10.7 – 13.6 
1751-3750 10.3 9.4 4 38.8 – 42.6 
>3751 4.7 5.6 2 36.0 – 42.3 
No Guardrail Total 2.1 3.1 4 127.0 – 187.9 
Guardrail Total 22.4 24.2 7 28.9 – 31.2 
TOTAL 24.5 27.3 11 40.2 – 44.8 
 
With proper costs, crash, and injury information in-service evaluations can result in 
reliable benefit-cost analyses (Alluri, Haleem, & Gan, 2012). The output benefit-cost ratio 
(BCR) RSAP generates is calculated by taking the reduction in crash costs and dividing by 
cost of the improvement (Equation 4). The reduction in crash costs (CC) takes in consideration 
the number of crashes that occur and the severity of each, while the costs of the improvement 
considers the installation (I), maintenance (M), and repair (RE) costs associated. The indices 
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(i.e. i and j) represent the different alternatives; for example, BCR21 is the benefit-cost ratio of 
Alternative 2 compared to Alternative 1. 
 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗+𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗+𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗�−(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖+𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)                                                                               (4) 
The results generated were not used, since the alternatives studied in this report looked 
at more than one situation and comparing based on this evaluation would be misleading. RSAP 
is designed to provide a BCR for altering safety devices, not altering situations. In this study, 
the situation is also being tested within the same model. Alternatives 1 and 2 have the same 
installation and maintenance costs, as they only differ in their offsets from the roadway. 
Because of this, Alternative 2 has reduced crashes, crash costs, and repair costs giving it a 
negative BCR, when it should be preferred and equal to its absolute value (5.03 with VSL of 
$5.4M and AADT of 1000). To account for this problem, Equation 5 was used, which differed 
only in that the denominator is the absolute value. This allowed the ratio to give the appropriate 
value to alternatives that were less expensive and had reduced crash costs. The results can be 
seen in Table 6.9, Table 6.10, and Table 6.11.  
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗��𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗+𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗+𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗�−(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖+𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)�                                                                              (5)  
 
To understand the three BCR tables, begin in the upper left corner at the intersection 
between Alternative 1 and Alternative 1. Each of these have a BCR equal to 0.00 since it 
relating to itself. To see if any of the alternatives have better or worse BCRs go along the row 
to the right until a BCR is greater than 2.00 (the decision point BCR). If an alternative satisfies 
this, travel down the column and see if any of the remaining alternatives on that row have a 
BCR greater than 2.0. Repeat this process until there is no alternative that meets this condition.  
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Table 6.9 Benefit-Cost Ratios with VSL of $5.4 Million 
1000 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 5.03 0.26 -0.22 -0.11 
Alt. 2  0.00 0.20 -0.31 -0.21 
Alt. 3   0.00 -0.78 -0.64 
Alt. 4    0.00 4.77 
Alt. 5     0.00 
2500 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 5.03 0.47 -0.39 -0.20 
Alt. 2  0.00 0.37 -0.54 -0.36 
Alt. 3   0.00 -1.56 -1.25 
Alt. 4    0.00 4.77 
Alt. 5     0.00 
5000 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 5.03 0.55 -0.44 -0.23 
Alt. 2  0.00 0.43 -0.61 -0.42 
Alt. 3   0.00 -1.87 -1.48 
Alt. 4    0.00 4.77 
Alt. 5     0.00 
 
Table 6.10 Benefit-Cost Ratios with VSL of $6.2 Million 
1000 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 5.60 0.28 -0.24 -0.12 
Alt. 2  0.00 0.22 -0.35 -0.23 
Alt. 3   0.00 -0.87 -0.71 
Alt. 4    0.00 5.31 
Alt. 5     0.00 
2500 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 5.60 0.53 -0.43 -0.22 
Alt. 2  0.00 0.41 -0.60 -0.40 
Alt. 3   0.00 -1.74 -1.39 
Alt. 4    0.00 5.31 
Alt. 5     0.00 
5000 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 5.60 0.61 -0.49 -0.25 
Alt. 2  0.00 0.48 -0.68 -0.46 
Alt. 3   0.00 -2.08 -1.65 
Alt. 4    0.00 5.31 
Alt. 5     0.00 
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Table 6.11 Benefit-Cost Ratios with VSL of $13.4 Million 
1000 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 12.49 0.63 -0.55 -0.27 
Alt. 2  0.00 0.50 -0.78 -0.51 
Alt. 3   0.00 -1.94 -1.59 
Alt. 4    0.00 11.84 
Alt. 5     0.00 
2500 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 12.49 1.18 -0.96 -0.49 
Alt. 2  0.00 0.92 -1.34 -0.90 
Alt. 3   0.00 -3.88 -3.10 
Alt. 4    0.00 11.84 
Alt. 5     0.00 
5000 AADT 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 
Alt. 1 0.00 12.49 1.37 -1.09 -0.56 
Alt. 2  0.00 1.07 -1.52 -1.03 
Alt. 3   0.00 -4.64 -3.67 
Alt. 4    0.00 11.84 
Alt. 5     0.00 
 
If none of the remaining alternatives have a BCR greater than 2.00 then the defending 
alternative (the alternative at the intersection with itself) is the most beneficial. A decision 
point BCR of 2.00 was used instead of 1.00 because this allowed for variance in uncertainty 
with the values used in the analysis.  
In each of the BCRs calculated the alternative with the best BCR was Alternative 2, 
which was the base condition (no guardrail) with a 10-foot offset from the edge of traveled 
way. The breakaway signal had a positive BCR but did not exceed the decision point BCR. 
Even under the extreme case where AADT is 31,000 (the highest value at a railroad-highway 
crossing in the state) and using a VSL of $13.4 million, the outputted BCR did not exceed the 
decision point compared to Alternative 2. However, this is still using the encroachment 
frequency graph shown in Figure 5.1 and it is possible that Alternative 3 could become the best 
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benefit-cost choice at a lower AADT. Nevertheless, this alternative requires extreme 
circumstances to become the most cost-effective solution. Both the guardrail alternatives were 
negative compared to the three previous alternatives. Like the base conditions with only the 
signal mast, the guardrail alternative with a 10-foot offset was also more beneficial than that 
of the 6-foot offset. Although Alternative 5 received more crashes than Alternative 4 despite 
the extended lateral clearance from the guardrail, it had fewer crash costs associated. This 
suggests that the guardrail is performing as it should with the proper clearance, but the signal 
mast becomes exposed to motorists leaving the roadway to the left.  
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CHAPTER 7.    CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Summary 
The installation of “active” warning devices (crossing signals and gates) remains an 
important aspect of state and federal railroad crossing safety programs. The effectiveness of 
these devices in preventing collisions between motor vehicles and trains is well-documented, 
but their presence introduces a risk of collisions where an errant motor vehicle strikes the signal 
mast or other related infrastructure. While most active crossings are occupied by trains for only 
a few minutes each day, there is continuous presence of signal masts and related items such as 
crossing gate mechanisms, cantilever supports, and signal controller boxes. Currently these 
items are not designed to be crashworthy.  
The Iowa DOT developed a longitudinal guardrail system to protect errant motorists 
from striking non-frangible crossing signal hardware (this design differs substantially from the 
ring-style barrier occasionally used to protect signal masts from low-speed knockdowns by 
turning tractor-trailers). The Iowa design has been implemented at numerous crossings, most 
notably on rural highways that are under state jurisdiction. The MUTCD, RDG, and FHWA 
Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook suggest to not protect railroad crossing signals 
unless in a low-speed, industrial area where they may become vulnerable to turning trucks. 
They offer that a crash cushion could be used, if deemed necessary, however it is unclear 
whether this system is used, and its effectiveness over guardrail, if installed.  
The main objective of this study was to examine how the presence of guardrails 
affected the prevalence and severity of motor vehicle strikes involving crossing signal masts 
and related infrastructure. To address this question, 10 years of law enforcement crash-report-
77 
narratives were reviewed for more than 1800 active crossings in Iowa, along with supplemental 
data from the Iowa Department of Transportation and the Federal Railroad Administration. 
The review indicates that 156 crashes involving signal masts or related hardware 
occurred between 2007 and 2016, an average of 15.6 crashes per year. Crashes involving signal 
masts were the most prevalent, followed by vehicles striking the guardrail. Although rare, there 
were also complex cases such as a vehicle that initially struck a train and then became wedged 
between the train and a signal mast. It was found that crash rates were the greatest at crossings 
with flashing-lights-and-gates-only and least at crossings with flashing-lights-and-cantilever-
beam-only. Crossings that had a barrier present resulted in higher crash rates and those that 
had longitudinal guardrail on both sides were found to have higher rates than those with it only 
on one side. 
The present research indicates that crashes involving signal masts and related items 
occur with some regularity, and occasionally result in death or serious injury. There was one 
fatal crash and four major-injury crashes involving signal masts over the 10-year period. Most 
of the remaining crashes involving crossing signal hardware or barriers installed at crossings 
were of moderate to low severity. Overall, the severity of the crashes appears to be lower with 
guardrail, but this result is not statistically significant due to the small number of guardrail-
involved crashes.  
Negative binomial models were estimated to compare the rate of crashes, both with and 
without the presence of guardrails or similar barriers. The results indicate that while the 
presence of a guardrail/barrier resulted in fewer crashes involving signal masts, there was no 
significant difference in the total rate of crashes involving railroad infrastructure. In other 
words, the reduction in signal mast strikes appears to have been offset by a corresponding 
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increase in guardrail strikes. An ordered logit model was estimated to determine the 
significance of many different variables on crash severity. The results revealed that seatbelt 
use, airbag deployment, and vehicle type impacted injury outcomes. No significant differences 
were observed between those crashes that involved collisions with guardrail and those that did 
not. 
 Simulation analyses were conducted using the Roadside Safety Analysis Program 
(RSAP) to estimate the number of crashes that would be expected under various scenarios. The 
results estimate that between 24.5 and 27.3 crashes per ten years would involve railroad 
infrastructure on rural primary highways in Iowa. Comparing these estimates to actual crash 
outcomes from the in-service evaluation suggest that between 40.2% and 44.8% of these 
crashes may go unreported. However, the lack of data regarding unreported crashes makes it 
difficult to assess how closely these estimates reflect the true rate of underreporting. 
One recommendation is to provide more lateral space between the signal support and 
the edge of the traveled way, which would reduce the probability of a vehicular strike. 
Providing an additional 4 feet of clearance (from 6-foot offset to 10-foot offset) was found to 
provide the most economically-viable solution through the RSAP analyses with a benefit-cost 
ratio (BCR) of around 5.00. Allowing this offset would eliminate the need for installing 
guardrail systems, reducing costs. While end terminals have improved over the last decade, 
they still can be as dangerous as striking the fixed object itself and protecting the signal does 
not provide enough benefits according to the RSAP results. 
This change may require changes in the size and placement of the associated signs and 
lights, which could have higher installation costs with larger gates and cantilever beams. Other 
things to consider regarding the sight visibility problems can include drivers not 
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comprehending the upcoming intersection and possibly a higher non-compliance of motorists 
at crossings. 
While guardrail reduces the crash severity and the cost per crash, the number of crashes 
it creates outweighs the safety benefit. Guardrail may also be dangerous to certain road users, 
such as motorcyclists, and may increase the number of head-on collisions with drivers moving 
over to the left approaching oncoming traffic. 
7.2 Limitations 
A limitation with the dataset is that the crash information provided for this study is only 
of reported crashes within the state of Iowa. Because of this, there is an unknown amount of 
unreported crashes at these locations. Underreporting may exist; however, it is believed that 
this would be more prevalent for lower severity and property-damage only crashes, as it is 
expected that all fatal and serious injury crashes are reported. Future law enforcement 
investigations of crash scenes could include photos allowing researchers and engineers to 
understand the true in-service evaluation.  
There are several reasons to suggest why drivers may not want to report such crashes. 
This list could include: lack of insurance, under the influence of drugs or alcohol, unknowingly 
struck them, or simply did not see the need to report it. To better understand driver behavior 
leading up to such crash events, naturalistic driving studies present a promising avenue for 
future research. Within this study it was apparent that there were very few cases where drivers 
hit the guardrail or other protective barrier. It is quite possible that the driver did not include 
this in their report with the law enforcement officer. 
Another limitation could be from the RSAP software. The encroachment data used in 
the software is based on 1978 field collections (RoadSafe LLC, 2012b) and the accuracy of 
these data for current roadway conditions is uncertain. The Engineer’s Manual addresses these 
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concerns and future NCHRP research aims to reevaluate these models. The installation, 
maintenance, and repair costs used in the analysis can also vary depending upon site location. 
Along with that, RSAP may overestimate the repair costs as multiple crashes at the same 
location within close time proximity could be repaired under the same work order. 
7.3 Future Research 
Additional studies to compare these results with other crossing signal protection barrier 
designs would be valuable. Other locations in the United States known to use some type of 
barrier include Idaho and Washington State, and other countries include Australia, Finland, 
Germany, and Japan. Alternatively, crash dynamics could be explored using finite element 
analysis to confirm the effects of barrier use on crash severity and to explore which barrier 
designs are the most effective in minimizing signal mast crash effects on vehicle occupants. 
There were a few journal articles presented in this paper that used this methodology looking at 
the effects guardrail had on luminaire poles (Pajouh, Reid, Bielenberg, Schmidt, & Faller, 
2017; Pajouh, Bielenberg, Schmidt, Faller, & Reid, 2017). This method could be transferred 
to railroad signal masts to find the optimal placement from a crash analysis perspective. 
Although the use of the longitudinal guardrail system did not appear to have a strong 
effect on crash rates at active at-grade crossings in Iowa, other methods for reducing crash 
prevalence and severity could be explored further in future research. For example, crashworthy 
signal assemblies can probably be developed for flashing-signal-only crossings. Perhaps this 
can be accomplished at moderate cost by adapting standard traffic signal hardware 
(transformer bases or shear plates that comply with crashworthiness standards, lighter signal 
heads, etc.). If such a change is possible, fewer serious injuries and fatalities could be expected, 
and there would no longer be a need for guardrail to protect the signal. Consequences from this 
design could include more nuisance strikes, maintenance, and motorists may come prone to 
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trains passing with signals knocked down. Since signal masts with gate assemblies require 
being fixed on a sturdy base, the universal signal mast would no longer exist, making upgrading 
crossings from flashing-light-only to flashing-light-with-gates expensive and more time 
consuming.  
The development of more-crashworthy railroad crossing signal hardware would require 
collaboration between transportation agencies, railroads, and railroad equipment suppliers. 
While this requires overcoming resistance to change, the required engineering research and 
development effort appears to be relatively modest. Other possibilities include better 
communication between the different transportation agencies involved to ensure the proper 
designs and clearances of these signaling devices from the roadway and safety barriers. Future 
RSAP models could also be performed to study the likelihood of encroachments at different 
scenarios (e.g. urban non-primary highways or locations with ring-style guardrail) and various 
offsets to test for sensitivity. A sensitivity analysis could also be conducted on other variables 
in the model, such as the design life or the discount rate. 
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